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This Article analyzes the development of the National Labor Rela-
tions Act through the drafts of the original Act. The author traces the
evolution of Senator Wagner's ideas through numerous policy and political
battles to the passage of the NLRA in 1935. The author explores the devel-
opment of the drafts and the historical context surrounding their creation
to reveal the social theory of the drafters and illuminate previously unex-
plored undercurrents in the text of the Act itself. The author, through this
novel approach to the NLRA, sets up a new way to view the 1935 Act, and
evaluates subsequent amendments and legal developments.
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Late in 1933, Senator Robert Wagner told his young and new assis-
tant Leon Keyserling I that he wanted a bill establishing a labor court to
t Professor of Law, University of Miami School of Law; Director, Project in Labor Theory;
A.B., Georgetown University, 1971; J.D., Harvard University Law School, 1974. The author wishes
to thank Dennis Lynch for insights regarding the contemporary significance of the drafts.
1. Leon Keyserling graduated from Harvard Law School in 1931 and studied economics at
Columbia University under Rexford Tugwell. On Tugwell's recommendation, Jerome Frank gave
him his first government job in the Agriculture Adjustment Administration. He was Senator Wag-
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enforce Section 7(a) of the National Industrial Recovery Act
("NIRA"). 2 That Section guaranteed the right of employees to organize
and bargain collectively. In January of 1934, Wagner held a summit
meeting to discuss preliminary ideas and proposals. Present in Senator
Wagner's office were William Green, President of the American Federa-
tion of Labor ("AFL"); John L. Lewis, President of the United Mine
Workers; Henry Warrum, Counsel for the AFL; Charles Wyzanski, So-
licitor for the Department of Labor; the Senator; and Keyserling.3
Shortly thereafter, or contemporaneously, Keyserling prepared a docu-
ment labeled, "Proposals for National Labor Board-January 31, 1934-
Substantive Principles." 4 It included seven topics:
(1) Recognition of right to bargain collectively
(2) Employee and employer limits for purposes of bargaining
collectively
(a) Majority rule for employees
(3) Representation
(a) Right to elect outside representatives
(b) Mention of representative union in contract
(4) Elections
(a) How frequently, and upon what occasion
(b) Effect of elections
(5) Terms of agreements
(a) Obligation to reach agreement
(b) Right to have closed shop
(c) Effect of prior union contracts
(d) Personal responsibility of individuals for union contracts
(6) Problem of company unions
ner's sole legislative aide from 1933 to 1938 and became general counsel of the National Housing
Agency. President Truman later appointed him Chairman of the Council of Economic Advisers.
Besides the Wagner Act and the National Housing Act, he drafted the Full Employment Act of
1946, and ghost-wrote many of the Humphrey-Hawkins amendments to that statute. A persistent
and strong voice for Keynesian economic policy, which advocates governmental social spending and
monetary policies to stimulate the economy, Leon Keyserling worked for his beliefs until his death
on August 9, 1987.
2. Ch. 90, 48 Stat. 195, 198-99 (1933) (ruled unconstitutional in Schechter Poultry Corp. v.
United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935)).
3. For a description of the people, political climate, strategy and design of the Wagner Act,
see Casebeer, Holder of the Pen: An Interview with Leon Keyserling on Drafting the Wagner Act, 42
U. MIAMI L. REV. 285 (1987). See also Keyserling, The Wagner Act: Its Origin and Current Signifi-
cance, 29 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 199 (1960); Keyserling, Why the Wagner Act?, in THE WAGNER
ACT AFTER TEN YEARS 8 (L. Silverberg, ed. 1945).
4. The drafts discussed in and appended to this Article, and the papers discussed in the Arti-
cle, unless otherwise noted, are in the personal files of Leon Keyserling, which are in the possession
of his family in Washington D.C. A copy of the drafts and files on the Wagner Act are held by the
Project in Labor Theory, University of Miami Law Library.
For changes in drafts occurring after the introduction of the bills, see 1 NATIONAL LABOR




(a) Definition of company union
(b) Prohibition of interference, influence, coercion or restraint
(c) Prohibition of specified other activities of company unions
(7) The right to strike
(a) Effect of failure to utilize existing machinery before striking
Between January 31, 1934 and the printing of the first confidential
committee draft of the Labor Disputes Act, on February 27, 1934,
Keyserling produced eight, or perhaps nine,5 different drafts based on
these principles.6 Following substantial changes by Wagner's office dur-
ing consideration before the Senate Committee on Education and Labor,
the Chairman, David Walsh of Massachusetts, struck the entire Wag-
ner/Keyserling draft and substituted a draft by Labor Department Solic-
itor Wyzanski. An embarrassed Senator Wagner withdrew this bill, still
bearing his name, in June of 1934 when President Roosevelt's preference
for a mixture of ad hoc industry boards and temporary approaches to the
NIRA became a reality with Joint Resolution 44.
In November 1934, Keyserling, having been ordered to redraft a
stronger bill, began working from the final Wagner version of the Labor
Disputes Act, dated May 5, 1934. In basically two drafts, but with sub-
stantial input via memoranda from the staff of the nonstatutory National
Labor Board ("NLB"), Keyserling produced the National Labor Rela-
tions Act ("NLRA" or "Wagner Act"). Senator Wagner introduced this
bill on February 15, 1935, and Congress passed it with little structural
change that June.7
This Article analyzes the texts of Leon Keyserling's drafts, explicat-
ing their evolution based on his personal files. Little attempt will be
made to review the legislative history and politics of the Act's passage
contained in other works.' Rather, this analysis will be based on the
texts themselves, supplemented by a few correlative texts surrounding
5. The confusion of the exact number of drafts concerns Drafts 2(a) and 2(b). See infra Ap-
pendix, pp. 102-11. One version of the second draft was dated February 19, 1934. All the other
drafts after it were not dated. The confidential committee draft, while substantially identical to the
last preprinted draft, Draft 8, infra pp. 116-20, did contain some wording changes.
6. Of the seven substantive principles: (1) appears in Draft 2(a), infra p. 103; (2)(a), Draft
2(a), infra pp. 104-05; (3)(a), Draft I, infra p. 102; (4)(a), Draft 3, infra p. 113; (4)(b), Draft 2(a),
infra pp. 104-05; (5)(a) & (b), Draft 2(a), infra p. 104; (5)(c), Draft 3, infra p. 112; (6)(a), Draft 2(a),
infra p. 103; (6)(b) & (c), Draft 1, infra p. 102; (7), Draft 8, infra p. 120.
7. National Labor Relations Act, ch. 372, 49 Stat. 449 (1935) (codified as amended at 29
U.S.C. §§ 151-169 (1982).
8. For the best review of the legislative history, see I. BERNSTEIN, THE NEW DEAL COLLEC-
TIVE BARGAINING POLICY (1950).
On the administrative history, see I J. GROSS, THE MAKING OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELA-
TIONS BOARD (1974). On political and legal culture, see P. IRONS, THE NEW DEAL LAWYERS
(1982). On both, see C. TOMLINS, THE STATE AND THE UNIONS: LABOR RELATIONS, LAW AND
THE ORGANIZED LABOR MOVEMENT IN AMERICA: 1880-1960 (1985), and S. VIT-roz, NEW DEAL
LABOR POLICY AND THE AMERICAN INDUSTRIAL ECONOMY (1987).
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the drafts. Several reasons suggest this concentration. First, and most
simply, the draftsv'document the origins of the language of the National
Labor Relations Act. Second, the drafts provide evidence that the intent
of the draftsmen went beyond what has normally been attributed to the
legislative history in academic circles.9 Third, the drafts permit identify-
ing interpretive and social tensions attending the Act's passage and
prefiguring issues of importance for administrative and judicial construc-
tions of the Act.
Existing academic accounts diminish the appreciation of the intel-
lectual and political achievement of the Wagner Act's sponsor and draft-
ers even as the statute continues to receive tribute as Labor's Magna
Carta. Specifically, the following related observations have been under-
emphasized when they appear in current literature. First, a serial review
of the texts demonstrates Keyserling's overarching concern for develop-
ing a labor policy that promotes economic recovery. Second, the eco-
nomic and legal philosophies of Keyserling and Wagner differ in
important areas from those of the Presidential New Deal. Third, the
issues of authorship between Keyserling and Wyzanski, and jurisdiction
over administrative enforcement between an independent agency and the
Labor Department, concern differences in labor policy and constitutional
argument as much as battles over political turf. Fourth, Keyserling and
Wagner believed that freeing workers required restructuring the state
and its economic roles more than writing a labor relations policy subject
to bureaucratic logrolling.
Usually, and probably inherently, such a self-contained study as this
risks mistakes of historical emphasis and causality, attributing too much
of the result to the intent of the drafters. But in the case of the Wagner
Act, several variables reduce the usual interpretive leaps. First, Senator
Wagner was an active and powerful legislator with a long background in
labor law and policy.'1 Second, the Senator insisted upon keeping con-
trol over the drafting process of virtually all legislation that he intro-
duced." Third, particularly in 1935, the anti-New Deal constitutional
vision secured by the striking down of the NIRA led many congressmen
to acquiesce in the legislation on the belief that the courts would find it
invalid. 2 Fourth, the massive Democratic congressional majorities pro-
duced in 1934 reduced the need for compromise after the second bill's
introduction. 3 Fifth, the AFL and organized labor willingly ceded the
9. See Casebeer, supra note 3.
10. Wagner litigated the first case outlawing labor injunctions in New York, Interborough
Rapid Transit Co. v. Lavin, 247 N.Y. 65, 159 N.E. 863 (1928), sponsored unemployment insurance
proposals in the late 1920s and sponsored the NIRA, including section 7(a).
11. I. BERNSTEIN, supra note 8, at 63 & 88.
12. P. IRONS, supra note 8, at 231.
13. I. BERNSTEIN, supra note 8, at 88.
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drafting specifics to Wagner's office, supporting any legitimization of or-
ganizing and bargaining. 4 Collectively, these variables suggest an ex-
traordinary degree of control over the drafting process. Moreover, given
Wagner's and Keyserling's control over drafting, it is extraordinary that




Structurally, the drafting process involved three separate functional
components: (1) The preamble established the predicate for the Act's
constitutionality. (2) The specification of unfair labor practices altered
incentive structures to encourage bargaining and increase labor's coun-
tervailing economic power to redistribute the wage bargain. (3) The es-
tablishment of an independent labor board facilitated enforcement of
bargaining rights through self-contained powers, avoiding reliance on the
historically somewhat hostile Justice Department. Furthermore, the
three functions interrelated quite specifically as a response to the Great
Depression. Keyserling believed strengthening labor essential to a proto-
Keynesian attack on underconsumption.' 6 Overcoming the lack of de-
mand as a barrier to economic recovery comfortably fit Robert Wagner's
commitment to central, democratic planning for economic stability and
economic progress. State supervision of labor relations in order to in-
crease labor's bargaining power would in turn redistribute the wage bar-
gain, and deter management adventures, thus removing the economic
drag particularly of recognition strikes. Thus, the particular practices
specified--determination of bargaining units, supervision of representa-
tion elections and fair bargaining practices-constituted natural points of
leverage most effectively translated into union power when enforced by a
speedy, specialized board. From this perspective, the drafts' sustained
emphasis on the preamble and the unfair labor practices belie such prof-
fered drafting motivations as strengthening enforcement of Section 7(a)
or modest reform and extension of the "common law" of the nonstatu-
tory boards.' 7 These motivations certainly influenced specific language
and topics of the draftsmen, but were subordinated to their chief aim of
strengthening labor's power.
14. Id. at 63.
15. Bernstein analyzes and outlines in detail only the penultimate draft, Draft 8, of the Labor
Disputes Act. Id. The other works do not discuss the drafts at all.
16. For the anticipation of governmentally planned demand strategies stabilizing and ex-
panding economic growth, see Finegold & Skocpol, State, Party, and Industry: From Business Recov-
ery to the Wagner Act in America's New Deal, in STATEMAKING AND SOCIAL MOVEMENTS 159 (C.
Bright & S. Harding eds. 1984).
17. See traditional analysis of drafting motivations in J. GROSS, supra note 8, at 67 & 132; and
I. BERNSTEIN, supra note 8, at 60-62, 85 & 88.
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A. Draft 118
The chronological development of the drafts reveals a coherent core
of main characteristics. The focus of the brief first draft is telling. Draft
1 consists entirely of one section which prohibits company unions and
specifies five illegal circumventions of the prohibition. Two subsections
prevent direct or indirect company sponsorship of unions, and three pre-
vent interference with independent organizing activity.
The prohibition of company unions prevents employer participation
in any organization concerned with bargaining over wages, hours and
conditions of employment. Keyserling and Wagner thought that com-
pany unions posed the chief barrier to voluntary organizations having
any real power to substantially affect wage redistribution and job secur-
ity. 9 The initial appearance of the wages, hours and conditions of em-
ployment language as the natural object of union activity within such an
anti-company union proviso seemingly eliminates the suggestion that the
"wages, hours" terminology was intended to limit the subject matter of
collective bargaining. 20
B. Draft 2(a) 21
Draft 2(a) introduces a declaration of policy, definitions, protection
of a right to organize, and further specification of employer responsibili-
ties. Most of the key provisions are recognizable as they appear in the
final draft, and the nonprocedural provisions mainly codify the so-called
common law of the nonstatutory National Labor Board.22
The Declaration of Policy,23 however, broadens the scope of the Act
beyond the mere elimination of company unionism and support for inde-
18. See infra p. 102.
19. The strength of Keyserling's concerns about company unions reemerging is reflected in his
rejection of this later Department of Labor suggestion to modify the NLRA draft: "Section 2, Sub.
5. Strike the word 'dealing' on page 3, line 21, and substitute 'bargain collectively'."
This is an extremely important amendment, and a very bad one. Most company un-
ions do not consider themselves as engaging in collective bargaining except in a vague way.
Their principal purpose is the "adjustment" of individual grievances. If the definition of
labor organizations is to be confined to organizations which bargain collectively, then most
of the activity of employers in connection with company unions which we are seeking to
outlaw would fall outside the scope of the Act. If, as employers insist, such "plans", etc.,
are lawful representatives of employees, then employers activity relative to them should
clearly be included, whether they merely "adjust" or exist as a "method of contract", or
engage in genuine collective bargaining. It is for this reason that the bill uses the broad
term "dealing with".
Keyserling Papers, supra note 4.
20. See Casebeer, supra note 3, at 356.
21. See infra pp. 102-05.
22. Bernstein identifies four central ideas of the NLB: (1) the right of employees to associate
and choose representatives, (2) the injunction to employers not to interfere in organizing, including
through company unions, (3) the right to choose outside representatives by majority rule, and (4) the
duty to bargain in good faith. I. BERNSTEIN, supra note 8, at 60-62.
23. Section 5, infra pp. 102-03.
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pendently organized unions in Draft 1. Predicated on the NIRA's per-
mission to corporations to cooperate under industrial codes, thus adding
leverage over the isolated individual's lack of economic power and the
resulting disparity in bargaining power, the Act intended to equalize bar-
gaining power. The declared policy also went beyond equalizing bargain-
ing power to encourage collective bargaining agreements and to
discourage industrial strife. Attention thus turns from unions to their
consequences for workers.
The definitions in Section I124 are broad and inclusive. Important
terms are "employer," which applies the Act to an employer of one or
more employees, and "company union."
Section III, labeled General Policies,25 begins with the first affirma-
tive guarantee of the right to organize. It closely tracks the first guaran-
tees of Section 7(a) of the NIRA: to bargain collectively, to choose
representatives, and to engage in concerted activities for mutual aid or
protection. The second paragraph prevents employer interference with
organization, prohibits company unions, and for the first time affirma-
tively permits a closed shop.26 The closed shop contains a proviso that
seventy-five percent of the employees of the employer belong to the union
and that the union place no inequitable restrictions on membership."
The second paragraph closes with a rewording of the prohibited practices
in Draft 1.
The third paragraph creates for the first time a duty to bargain: the
duty to use "every reasonable effort to make and maintain agreements
concerning rates of pay, rules and working conditions."2 This language
appears broader than "wages, hours and conditions of employment"
sometimes construed to limit the remaining terms to issues capable of
being translated into a form of wages.29
The fourth Section makes the "National Labor Board," also appear-
ing for the first time, the determining body for representatives in any
dispute by two or more groups of employees, and authorizes the Board to
conduct elections by secret ballot and to prohibit employer interfer-
ence.30 Subsection (b) authorizes the Board to determine bargaining unit
24. See infra p. 103.
25. See infra pp. 103-05.
26. Section III, Second, (a), infra p. 104.
27. This provision was attacked by Leonard Boudin and others who feared discrimination by
unions against racial and ethnic minorities which would find themselves without representation or
recourse. See Casebeer, supra note 3, at 356; I. BERNSTEIN, supra note 8, at 67. Keyserling reports
that Wagner was sympathetic but felt that the bill had to concentrate solely on employer practices
lest those opposed to broad labor protections, such as Labor Solicitor Wyzanski, use this precedent
to argue for including a more general bill of particulars against unfair labor practices of unions. Id
28. Section III, Third, infra p. 104.
29. Casebeer, supra note 3, at 330-31 & 352.
30. Section 111, Fourth, (a), infra p. 104.
1989]
INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS LAW JOURNAL
by employer, craft, or plant, and to settle disputes over the sole repre-
sentatives chosen by elections a.3  Thus, for the first time it states the prin-
ciple of majority rule of those employees eligible to participate, and
implicates the government in craft versus industrial organizational
disputes.
C. Draft 2(b) 32
Draft 2(b) contains the title "Labor Disputes Act" and consists
solely of Title III, the creation of the National Labor Board and the spec-
ification of its powers and procedures. Its models were the Federal Trade
Commission Act, 33 the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934,34 and the
Railway Labor Act. 3" The National Labor Board was to be composed of
five members who, with a separate administrator known as the executive
secretary, hired and supervised the agency's staff.36 A separate panel of
six employer and six employee representatives were to serve as associate
members who could be invited in equal numbers to participate in Board
decisions.37
In Draft 2(b), the Board is empowered to investigate, hold hearings
on, prevent, and remedy any unfair labor practice (undefined), if that
practice has led or tends to lead to a labor dispute that might burden
commerce. 31 Penalties are provided for failure to respond or testify and
enforcement could be obtained in any federal district court with compe-
tent jurisdiction. 39 Aggrieved persons could appeal for review and modi-
fication of the Board's orders, although the Board's findings of fact were
given deference.' The Board is empowered to act as an arbitrator in
labor disputes.41 Section 30742 copies the Board unit determination and
representative election procedures of Draft 2(a).4 3 This is its only over-
lap with any other draft until the last draft.
31. Infra pp. 104-05.
32. See infra pp. 105-11.
33. Ch. 311, 38 Stat. 717 (1914) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 41-58 (1982 & Supp. IV
1986)).
34. Ch. 404, 48 Stat. 881 (1934) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-78hh (1982 & Supp.
IV 1986)).
35. Railway Labor Act, ch. 347, 44 Stat. 577 (1926) (codified as amended at 45 U.S.C. §§ 151-
163 & 181-188 (1982)).
36. Sections 301 & 302(a), infra p. 105.
37. Section 302(b), infra pp. 105.
38. Section 304(a)-(c), infra pp. 106-07.
39. Section 304(d), infra p. 107.
40. Section 304(e), infra pp. 107.08.
41. Section 306, infra p. 108.09.
42. See infra pp. 109-110.




Draft 3 returns to the format of Draft 2(a). It begins with a three-
fold preface: to remove obstructions to interstate commerce, to equalize
bargaining power, and to encourage amicable settlement of labor dis-
putes. A National Labor Board enforces its provisions.45 The preface is
followed by the first full preamble, Section 8,' which markedly broadens
the scope of the Act. At this point, the problems of strikes and inequality
of bargaining power are seen as both independent and part of the larger,
historical pattern of economic development. This viewpoint is in sharp
contrast with the sparse reference to strikes obstructing commerce of
Draft 2(b). It begins by noting the integration and centralization of cor-
porate control over economic resources and the impact on individual
bargaining power. The preamble finds that this imbalance eliminates ac-
tual liberty of contract (the prevailing definition of constitutionally pro-
tected liberty), and treats the resulting wage as inadequate to preserve the
worker's standard of living. These trends result in a failure of consumer
welfare to match production surpluses in periodic depressions caused by
overproduction. It is this depression, not strikes per se, that burdens in-
terstate commerce. Strikes resulting from the attempt to achieve union
recognition to redress the inequality of bargaining power add to the
diminishment of the total economic output and prevent the redress of
power imbalances. In short, the first full preamble describes a Keynesian
approach to economic recovery, of which a labor organization policy is a
crucial component.
The definitions section follows with few changes: employees subject
to the Railroad Labor Act are exempted, and the term company union is
dropped.47 The guarantee of the right to organize is reworded in Section
10, but its content remains the same.4" The prohibitions on practices
interfering with the right to organize are the same as those in Draft 2(a)
with two changes. Most importantly, the closed shop provision, now
Section 1 (b)(5), requires only a sixty-percent majority, and discrimina-
tory practices specify that employers may not by written or oral state-
ments interfere, or by soliciting or maintaining membership lists, coerce
membership decisions. 49 A new Section 11(c) abrogates contracts en-
tered into before the Act's enactment that are in conflict with the Act.50
The duty to bargain is referred to twice in this draft. The first refer-
ence is to a duty to bargain rather than a reasonable effort to reach agree-
44. See infra pp. 111-13.
45. Infra p. 111.
46. Infra p. 111.
47. Section 9, infra p. 111-12.
48. Infra p. 112.
49. Infra p. 112.
50. Infra p. 112.
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ments as in the first version.5 The second reference, however, retains the
reasonable effort to reach agreements language. 52 Any organization that
imposes inequitable restrictions upon membership is not entitled to rep-
resent nonmembers.53 Finally, Section 7(a) of the NIRA is repealed.
E. Draft 454
Draft 4 changes the definition of employee to include any employee,
not employees of any particular employer." It also adds a new Section
12(c) providing that where no representative has been selected by a ma-
jority, any representative of two or more employees may bargain. This
experiment was thought to be a safe concession to supporters of some
form of company union alternative, and perhaps also a safeguard for mi-
nority viewpoints. The Board's settlement of employee disputes over
representation binds the employees for one year.
F Draft 5 56
Draft 5 changes the definition of employer to restrict it to one of five
or more employees; exempts federal, state and municipal governments,
and labor organizations; and changes the term "employees" to include
those unemployed by virtue of work stoppages. 57 Section 1 1(b)(4) rein-
states a seventy-five-percent majority requirement for a closed shop.5"
Section 12(b) provides for a sole representative upon election by a major-
ity of those who are eligible, or by a majority of those participating in a
vote if forty percent of those are eligible. 9 Concomitantly, Section 12(c)
drops the previous draft's experiment of multiple bargaining units.'
G. Draft 661
Draft 6 adds to the preamble partial governmental responsibility
under the NIRA industrial codes for the tendency of economic concen-
tration. It condenses some of the language on underconsumption and
depression. 62 The term "employer" is defined once again as one who
employs one or more employees.63 Section 11 for the first time uses the
51. Section 12(a), infra p. 112.
52. Section 13, infra p. 113.
53. Section 12(b), infra p. 112-13 (second proviso).
54. See infra p. 113 (changes only).
55. Section 9, infra p. 113.
56. See infra pp. 114-15 (changes only).
57. Section 9, infra p. 114.
58. Infra p. 114.
59. Infra p. 114.
60. Infra p. 115; see Draft 4, § 12(c), infra p. 113.
61. See infra pp. 115-16 (changes only).
62. Infra p. 115.
63. Section 9, infra p. 115.
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phrase "unfair labor practice" to describe the practices prohibited to em-
ployers. 4 Many subsections are reordered, and Section 12 retains only
subsection (b). The section describing the effect of preexisting contracts
is reworded. Contracts made within two months of enactment are con-
clusively presumed to be in anticipation of it.65
H. Draft 766
Draft 7 only changes some of the wording of early drafts.
I. Draft 867
Draft 8 substantially represents the bill sent to committee on Febru-
ary 27, 1934. The most significant change is the addition of Section 303,
guaranteeing that nothing in the Act should be construed to impair the
right to strike.68 Wagner and Keyserling felt the economic power of the
strike would be the chief enforcement of the Act's provisions once organ-
ization was in place, and agreed to add this guarantee to emphasize the
point. Following a renumbering of sections, Section 3 adds a definition
of interstate commerce.6 9 Section 5 removes the prohibition of member-
ship lists. It also limits the closed shop to contracts of less than one year
and is triggered by simple majority.70 New Section 6(a) creates a catchall
unfair labor practice which tends to lead to a labor dispute that might
burden commerce and makes it a criminal misdemeanor subject to a
$500 fine for each day of violation. 71 New Section 6(b) vests federal dis-
trict courts with authority to prevent unfair labor practices burdening
commerce but prevents this power from interfering with the National
Labor Board's powers defined in Title 11.72
Title II is substantially the same as Draft 2(b) with a streamlining of
language. However, the five member National Labor Board becomes a
tripartite group with one representative each of employers and employ-
ees, and three neutrals, one of whom is designated chairman. 73 A media-
tion function is introduced.74 Most importantly, the majority rule
principle of choosing sole representatives is changed in Section 207 to
64. See infra p. 115.
65. Section 13(b), infra p. 116.
66. See infra p. 116 (changes only).
67. See infra pp. 116-20.
68. Infra p. 120.
69. Infra p. 117.
70. Section 5(e), infra p. 118 (second proviso).
71. Infra p. 118.
72. Infra p. 118.
73. Section 201, infra p. 119.
74. Section 204, infra p. 119. Senator Wagner believed a tripartite board would contribute to
mediation based on his National Labor Board experience. See I. BERNSTEIN, supra note 8, at 64
n.42.
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leave the Board discretion in certifying representatives following a super-
vised election.75 A new Title III creates the United States Conciliation
Service in the Department of Labor, a concession to that Department.76
J. Labor Disputes Act of 193477
The Labor Disputes Act as introduced differs only in the following
respects. Governmental responsibility for economic concentration drops
out of the preamble. In Section 5 an unfair labor practice occurs by fail-
ure to notify employees pursuant to Section 304(b) of the statute's effects
on contracts. The criminalization of unfair labor practices is dropped
from Section 6, and the district courts may intervene solely by request of
representatives of the National Labor Relations Board ("NLRB" or
"Board"). The election of representatives under Board supervision
moves to Title II.
In Title II, the Board expands to seven members, two employers,
two employees, and three neutrals. The neutrals serve five year terms,
and the others serve one year terms. The panels of associate members of
employers and employees are dropped. Section 204 on mediation is
streamlined, and there is ambiguity as to whether mediation extends to
all contract disputes or just unfair practices. Hearings before the Board
are not subject to the rules of evidence. The Board's remedial powers are
inclusive: cease and desist orders, affirmative actions, back pay and dam-
ages, and reinstatement or other acts to achieve substantial justice under
the circumstances.
K. National Labor Relations Act, Draft 178
The 1935 bill, or National Labor Relations Act, already changed
substantially by Wagner's office during Senate Committee deliberation
from March through May 1934, is changed further in Keyserling's first
draft in November 1934. Basically he used the May 5, 1934 bill as a
chronology of subjects and sections in working toward a more flexible,
generalized enabling language for the Board's powers.7 9
Keyserling had already rewritten the preamble or Declaration of
Policy, copying almost verbatim Section 2 of the Norris-LaGuardia
Act.S8 The preamble begins with a reference to prevailing economic con-
ditions, developed with government involvement, pitting owners aggre-
gated in corporations against the individual worker helpless to protect
75. Section 207, infra pp. 119-20.
76. Section 301, infra p. 120.
77. The bill of the Labor Disputes Act is found in NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD,
supra note 4, at 1.
78. See infra pp. 120-30.
79. I. BERNSTEIN, supra note 8, at 88.
80. Ch. 90, 47 Stat. 70 (1932) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 101-115 (1982)).
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freedom of labor or contract and therefore unable to achieve a decent
living standard. It asserts that such living standards precipitate strikes
and burden commerce. It refers to underconsumption as the cause of
economic depressions, but it is not the explicit policy of the Act to attack
this condition. 1
Definitions in Section 2 remain virtually identical and as inclusive as
the limits of the commerce clause, except that the term "employees" ex-
cludes agricultural labor and domestic service.82 In order to prevent em-
ployer domination, the term "labor organizations" includes company
unions. For the same reason, grievances are added to those subjects of
concern to labor organizations.
The unfair labor practices of Section 8 are linguistically simplified
and limited to: (1) interfering with the right to organize of section 7; (2)
acting as a company union, but also providing that employers could still
confer with individual employees; (3) discriminating against the member-
ship decision; (4) disciplining an employee for making charges to the
Board; and (5) as added by Francis Biddle, chairman of the old National
Labor Relations Board, refusing to bargain collectively.83
Section 9 provides for majority rule. If no majority prevails, minor-
ity bargaining groups are allowed. But if a majority does prevail, minor-
ity groups would still be allowed to present grievances. Subsection (b)
retains Board supervision of elections and unit determination, and (c)
provides for court enforcement.84
This Draft creates a neutral three-person board with most of the
specific procedures of enforcement removed from the Labor Disputes
Act drafts.85 Staff employees of the old Board transfer to the new Board
with their files and records.8 6 Section 10(a) empowers the Board simply
to prevent any unfair labor practices under Section 8.87 Section 10(b)
permits the Board to decline jurisdiction over an unfair labor practice in
favor of alternative dispute resolution mechanisms.88 The district court
81. Section 1, infra p. 121.
82. Section 2(3), infra p. 121. Senator Wagner had been willing to include agricultural work-
ers if Secretary of Agriculture Wallace had joined the fight for their inclusion. He declined. See
Casebeer, supra note 3, at 334. In a 1935 memorandum, Keyserling analyzed the main revision
suggestions of Secretary of Labor Frances Perkins, including one on including agricultural workers:
"This amendment is submitted by the Secretary in a half-hearted way, i.e., by enclosing the words in
a parenthesis followed by a question mark. Of course, we favor this amendment in principle, but it is
Senator Wagner's view that the bill could not pass with such an amendment included." Keyserling
Papers, supra note 4.
83. Infra pp. 123-24.
84. Infra p. 124.
85. Section 3(a), infra p. 122.
86. Section 4(b), infra p. 123.
87. Infra p. 124.
88. Infra p. 125.
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enforcement and appeal provisions largely carry over. 89 Section 12 adds
a new arbitration section.90 Section 16 preserves the right to strike."' In
short, the National Labor Relations Act follows the pattern of the Labor
Disputes Act. Moreover, few changes of substance occurred from this
first draft until its introduction in February 1935.
L. National Labor Relations Act, Draft 292
The final draft represents the National Labor Relations Act as intro-
duced February 15, 1935, together with amendments of the Committee
on Education and Labor annotated by Keyserling as to their source or
sponsor.93 These annotations indicate how thoroughly Wagner's office
controlled the legislation in 1935. The preamble once again separates the
inequality of bargaining power and the resulting disequilibrium of wages
and production causing depression, from industrial strife and cumulative
interference with recovery. 94 Section 11 on district court prevention of
unfair labor practices, and Section 12 on arbitration are removed. 95
III
ESTABLISHING CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE NLRA
The preambles of the drafts described the aims of state intervention
in civil society in its express linkage of congressional power to regulate
market participants with individual constitutional rights permitting re-
sort to political bodies and economic markets to achieve personal inter-
ests. Furthermore, protection of organization plus a duty to bargain and
a guaranteed right to strike would naturally lead, without government
dictation, to economic power that would increase wages and create in-
dustrial peace.96
What most commentators fail to recognize is that unionization and
labor power were instruments serving state planning within an interde-
pendent economic-political web.97 Keyserling believed that the Congress
89. See § 10(f), infra p. 125-26.
90. See infra pp. 127-28.
91. Infra p. 129.
92. See infra pp. 130-31.
93. For the bill as introduced, see 1 NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD, supra note 4, at
1295.
94. Section 1, infra p. 130.
95. Infra p. 131.
96. Klare, Judicial Deradicalization of the Wagner Act and the Origins of Modern Legal Con-
sciousness, 1937-1941, 62 MINN. L. REV. 265, 281 n.53 (1978).
97. C. TOMLINS, supra note 8, at 124 ("[i]n Wagner's bills, however, 'labor' was conceived of
not as a set of organizations but as the mass of individual employees which constituted the labor
force"); see J. ATLESON, VALUES AND ASSUMPTIONS IN AMERICAN LABOR LAW 43 (1983).
See also Wagner, et al., Labor's Charter of Rights, 42 AM. FEDERATIONIST 361 (1935). Lloyd
Garrison, Chairman of the nonstatutory NLRB, argues that company unions make industry-wide
agreements impossible by definition and therefore interfere with effective economic planning. Id. at
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exercised central planning in its power to regulate interstate commerce,
intervening by action or inaction in a national economic market."a In
fact, imbalances in aggregate individual investment and consumption de-
cisions that prevented market clearing created identical economic drags
as previously recognized objects of congressional regulation: strikes in
key industries,9 9 unsafe transportation equipment, 100 or price fixing.'o If
so recognized, then governmental action redistributing the consequences
of market activity, in part structured by previous political decisions,
could not violate due process. Since inequalities of bargaining power
skewed supply and demand to the detriment of economic recovery for
all, the state's constitutional power to regulate the economy matched le-
gitimate constitutional expectations of economic right. 1°2
398. Dr. H.A. Mills, a member of the old NLRB, argues that inequality of bargaining power dis-
courages consumption, and therefore investment, and that codes like those of the NIRA depend
upon effectively organized labor unions as pressure groups balanced against other pressure groups.
Id. at 406-07.
98. Senator Wagner stated in a radio broadcast:
The main obstacle to recovery was an outworn philosophy of government that had
been suited to the oxcart era, but that was totally unadjusted to the machine age. It was a
dogma insisting upon extreme individualism at a time when the individual had become the
helpless victim of forces too big and too powerful for him to control. It was a dogma that
failed to perceive the need for national action although our mighty industries had burst the
bounds of conventional State lines and were country-wide or even international in their
scope. It scoffed at the possibilities of Nation-wide cooperation although cooperation was
the only safeguard against social disintegration on one hand or radical overthrow on the
other.
The Future of the National Industrial Recovery Act (National Radio Forum Broadcast, June 13,
1935), reprinted in 79 CONG. REC. 9417-18 (1935).
99. See Clayton Act §§ 7 & 8, ch. 323, 38 Stat. 730, 731 (1914) (codified as amended at 15
U.S.C. §§ 18 & 19 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986)) (upheld in Coronado Coal Co. v. United Mine Workers
I, 259 U.S. 344 (1922) (strike in restraint of trade violates antitrust laws)).
100. See Safety Appliance Acts, ch. 196, 27 Stat. 531 (1893), amended by ch. 976, 32 Stat. 943
(1903) (codified as amended at 45 U.S.C. §§ 1-10 (1982)) (upheld in Southern Ry. Co. v. United
States, 222 U.S. 20 (1911) (case concerning defective couplers on intrastate rail cars)); Employers'
Liability Act, ch. 149, 35 Stat. 65 (1908), amended by ch. 143, 36 Stat. 291 (1910) (codified as
amended by 45 U.S.C. §§ 51-60 (1982)) (upheld in Second Employers' Liability Cases, 223 U.S. 1
(1912) (railroad company liable for negligence to another railroad company's employee)).
101. See Interstate Commerce Act § 3, ch. 104, 24 Stat. 379, 380 (1887), repealed by Pub. L.
No. 95-473, § 4(b) & (c), 92 Stat. 1466, 1470 (1978) (upheld in Houston, E. & W. Tex. Ry. Co. v.
United States (The Shreveport Case), 234 U.S. 342 (1914) (finding that intrastate railroad rates affect
interstate rates)).
102. In introducing the Wagner Act in 1935, the Senator declared:
I want to emphasize even more strongly the constitutional power and the intent of
Congress to prevent these unfair labor practices even where they do not lead or threaten to
lead to strikes. As economic conditions have changed, courts on the whole have shown an
increasing willingness to recognize that unsound business practices are a direct burden
upon the regularity and volume of commerce ....
... When wages sink to low levels, the decline in purchasing power is felt upon the
marts of trade. And since collective bargaining is the most powerful single force in main-
taining and advancing wage rates, its repudiation is likely to intensify the redistribution of
buying power, thus reducing standards of living, unbalancing the economic structure, and
inducing depression with its devastating effect upon the flow of commerce.
79 CONG. REC. 7572 (May 15, 1935).
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This constitutional innovation, however, extended beyond justifying
a new regime of social and economic coordination by the state. It im-
plied a new constitutional jurisprudence. 0 3 The view of the relation of
state and civil society that makes the private sphere primary and in-
dependent inevitably derives public good from an aggregate of private
interests. It defines liberty solely in terms of restraints on governmental
intrusion, and defines regulation as negation of individual choices. Re-
placing the laissez-faire state derived from liberty of contract with a wel-
fare state derived from positive entitlements of organization and
solidarity, maintained the interrelationship of public and private spheres
but reversed the primacy of the good to that of community or societal
welfare. The public goods of economic progress and stability required
planning, and that planning specifically required increased consumption
supported by governmentally guaranteed adequate wages and improved
living standards. But such macroeconomic planning could only be fully
achieved by the microeconomic coordination that would result from so-
cial democracy being written into so-called private relations of
production.104
A quite different constitutional jurisprudence overthrew the "Loch-
ner era" °10 5 under the liberal-pluralist ideal of opposition of public inter-
est and private interests. Concomitantly, each person schizophrenically
shifted between personal economic and political power to serve her needs
and define herself.'016 Nor is this choice merely of philosophic import.
This jurisprudential difference separates the structure and style of the
103. In an article ostensibly authored by Senator Wagner, Leon Keyserling argued the correct-
ness of the NIRA coordinated state-private planning for recovery:
It may seem paradoxical that the gospel for freedom of business enterprise nurtured a
legal system which indulged solely in restraints and prohibitions. But this was inevitably
the case. You could not define the terms of free competition. You could not regulate
laissez-faire. You could not schematize planlessness. You could merely outlaw practices
which were deemed to interfere with the inordinate play of enterprise.
Wagner, Planning in Place of Restraint, 22 SURV. GRAPHIc 395, 396 (1933).
104. See the News Release of Senator Wagner concerning the Supreme Court's upholding of the
Wagner Act in NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937):
The principles of my proposal were surprisingly simple. They were founded upon the
accepted facts that we must have democracy in industry as well as in government; that
democracy in industry means fair participation by those who work in the decisions vitally
affecting their lives and livelihood; and that the workers in our great mass production
industries can enjoy this participation only if allowed to organize and bargain collectively
through representatives of their own choosing ....
But when I made the effort to get these principles embodied in an Act of Congress, I
was confronted by the most difficult fight in my whole public career, The powerful few
who could benefit by keeping the worker disorganized and helpless rallied to the attack.
Keyserling Papers, supra note 4.
105. For a discussion of the rise of substantive due process after Lochner v. New York, see
Sunstein, Lochner's Legacy, 87 COLUM. L. REV. 873 (1987).
106. For an argument that the public-private distinction proves incoherent, see Casebeer, To-
ward a Critical Jurisprudence-A First Step by Way of the Public-Private Distinction in Constitutional
Law, 37 U. MIAMI L. REv. 379 (1983). This incoherence masks the degree to which the private as
primary model still controls legal doctrine despite its supposed replacement. See Casebeer, Teaching
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Wagner Act as a component of state planning from the more traditional
and limited legal restraints approach of the Labor Department and its
solicitor, Charles Wyzanski.
The preamble to Wyzanski's bill which supplanted the Labor Dis-
putes Bill in the congressional committee in 1934, limited its constitu-
tional justification and regulation to restraint of labor practices leading to
strikes which hinder interstate commerce. It prevented some property
owners, including owners of labor and capital, from interfering with
maximum economic advantage of all. His definition of unfair labor prac-
tices restrained market interfering behavior of both labor and manage-
ment as if they represented formally equal and atomistic utility
maximizers.107 While Wyzanski's bill died in 1934, and Wagner's labor
relations doctrine eventually prevailed, Keyserling's constitutional vision
did not resonate in the Wagner Act's constitutional test in 1937.108 Fur-
thermore, the jurisprudential road taken in post-1937 constitutional law
read back into labor law assumptions contained in statutory interpreta-
an Old Dog Old Tricks: Coppage v. Kansas and At- Will Employment Revisited, 6 CARDOZO L. REV.
765 (1985).
107. I. BERNSTEIN, supra note 8, at 72.
108. Chief Justice Hughes' opinion in Jones & Laughlin Steel upholds the Wagner Act's consti-
tutionality under two rationales articulated in the Act's preamble. 301 U.S. at 22-23 n.2. The more
traditional justification was that strikes in vertically integrated, basic industries potentially shut
down the interstate economy:
When industries organize themselves on a national scale, making their relation to in-
terstate commerce the dominant factor in their activities, how can it be maintained that
their industrial labor relations constitute a forbidden field into which Congress may not
enter when it is necessary to protect interstate commerce from the paralyzing consequences
of industrial war?
Id. at 41. Less traditional was the theory that labor relations are a part of an economic process of
manufacturing, a part of a well understood course of business, and therefore, like stockyards, a part
of the flow of interstate commerce which Congress could supervise in the public interest. Id. at 35.
Thus, in an instrumental sense, Keyserling succeeded. Not only did the Act survive against all
predictions, but the Court's rationale recognized both strikes' burden on commerce and the legiti-
macy of countervailing power assurances in an increasingly integrated economy.
[The Act recognizes] that a single employee was helpless in dealing with an employer; that
he was dependent ordinarily on his daily wage for the maintenance of himself and his
family; that if the employer refused to pay him the wages that he thought fair, he was
nevertheless unable to leave the employ and resist arbitrary and unfair treatment; [and]
that [the] union was essential to give laborers opportunity to deal on an equality with their
employer.
Id. at 33.
But the key to the Hughes opinion was the steel company's voluntary choice to take advantage
of interstate operations. An affirmative responsibility of the national political process for individual
welfare in an interdependent economic grid depended upon seeing the imbalances of investment and
consumption as partially constituted by government policy and government sanctioned divisions of
labor and relations of production. Hughes declared:
The act does not interfere with the normal exercise of the right of the employer to
select its employees or to discharge them .... [Tihe Board is not entitled to make its
authority a pretext for interference with the right of discharge when that right is exercised
for other reasons than such intimidation and coercion.
Id. at 45-46. In short, Hughes' approach is consistent with the public power defined by restraints of
private prerogative.
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tion removed much of the planning potential of the Wagner Act even
before the substantial revisions in the Taft-Hartley Act. °9
The politically ingenious structure of a new constitutional order, ar-
ticulated as an economic recovery program, and implemented by a sub-
stantial reordering of labor policy and labor relations might have
comprised a radical change in American political life.11 ° But it did
not,"' as subsequent legal and historical accounts of the Act, built
through the hindsight of Board and court interpretations, obscured the
ideas behind the drafting process. 112
IV
CONFLICT OVER POLICY: WAGNER, THE DEPARTMENT OF
LABOR, AND WYZANSKI
The two most significant controversies about the drafting process
concern the role of labor and the Department of Labor. Actually, the
first creates interest because it did not become a controversy. In the early
1930s organized labor meant the AFL. It was clear from the early drafts
of the Labor Disputes Act that the Board would have authority to set
bargaining unit size by employer, craft, plant, or industry. Fledgling in-
dustrial unions were beginning in the steel and automobile industries and
the craft-based AFL attempted to have this provision changed, correctly
prophesizing that the statute would legitimate the future industrial
union. Yet, when Senator Wagner insisted on flexibility, the AFL
backed away and staunchly fought for both bills.' The drafters felt
they had no viable alternative. Leaving the unit decision to the employer
would invite gerrymandering and coercion, while leaving it to the em-
ployees might defeat the majority rule principle as well as create
inefficiencies.
The controversy involving the Labor Department arose in part from
109. See Klare, supra note 96. For the standard post Taft-Hartley vision, see, e.g., Cox, Some
Aspects of the Labor Management Relations Act, 61 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1947); Feller, A General
Theory of the Collective Bargaining Agreement, 61 CALIF. L. REV. 663 (1973); Shulman, Reason,
Contract, and Law in Labor Relations, 68 HARV. L. REV. 999 (1955).
For a critique of postwar labor law, see Stone, The Post War Paradigm in American Labor Law,
90 YALE L. J. 1509 (1981); Rogers, Divide and Conquer: The Legal Foundations of Postwar U.S.
Labor Policy (1984) (unpublished doctoral dissertation, Princeton University).
110. See Finegold & Skocpol, supra note 16.
111. Klare, supra note 96; Klare, Traditional Labor Law Scholarship and the Crisis of Collective
Bargaining Law:A Reply to Professor Finkin, 44 MD. L. REV. 731 (1985); C. TOMLINS, supra note 8.
112. Casebeer, supra note 3.
113. Possible reasons for the AFL's deference to Wagner might include: (1) Senator Wagner's
long championing of union causes, (2) Wagner's chairmanship of the first National Labor Board
with William Green and John L. Lewis, (3) Wagner's and Keyserling's rapport with AFL counsels
Charlton Ogburn and Henry Warrum, (4) labor's recent turn away from its traditional anti-statism
to supporting the promise of a social wage and other New Deal benefits, and (5) the overriding
importance of an enforceable set of § 7(a) rights.
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an independent rivalry between Leon Keyserling and Labor Department
Solicitor Charles Wyzanski." 4 The Roosevelt administration notori-
ously abdicated a coherent labor policy.' 1 5 Roosevelt's National Recov-
ery Act ("NRA") and his own settlement in the automobile industry
killed the 1934 act and only after the NLRA passed the Senate did it
receive the President's full blessing." 6 The Department of Labor had
not put forth an alternative strategy. Rather Secretary Perkins fought
for control over specific changes or approaches to the ideas initiated by
Wagner's office.
Most importantly, the Department wanted the NLRB to be located
within the Labor Department." 7 Those in charge of policy within the
114. See P. IRONS, supra note 8, at 325.
115. Because Senator Wagner sponsored much of the New Deal legislation, such as the Social
Security Act and the NIRA, his policy beliefs are often amalgamated with the New Deal. Yet
particularly in his planning approach to recovery through labor relations, housing, and public works,
Wagner championed causes shunned by Roosevelt. Ellis Hawley and those who rely on his work
downplay this factor. Cf E. HAWLEY, THE NEW DEAL AND THE PROBLEM OF MONOPOLY (1966);
Klare, supra note 96, at 283-84 n.58. Klare finds aspects of corporate liberalism (coordinated re-
sponses to overproduction), central planning (balancing consumption and investment by redistribu-
tion) and antitrust enforcement in the Wagner Act's preamble. He notes that President Roosevelt
never chose between these alternatives, but sampled from all of them. Id. To the extent Senator
Wagner accepted the first and third strategies, however, he subordinated them to attacking under-
consumption under governmental supervision.
116. Casebeer, supra note 3, at 325; cf P. IRONS, supra note 8, at 231 (Roosevelt still undecided
on NLRA even after Senate passage).
117. In addition to the annotations to the second 1935 draft, see infra pp. 328-30, in an undated
memorandum in 1935, Keyserling analyzed suggested changes received by Wagner's office from
Labor Secretary Frances Perkins. The chief dispute centered on the Board's location: in § 3(a),
Perkins struck the words "as an independent agency in the executive branch of the Government"
and substituted "in the Department of Labor." Keyserling commented:
It is best to consider also at this point the amendments offered to Section 4(a), provid-
ing that employees shall be appointed by the Board "with the approval of the Secretary of
Labor"; that "nothing in this Act shall be construed to authorize the Board to appoint
persons to engage in mediation, conciliation, or statistical work, when the services of such
persons may be obtained from other bureaus or divisions in the Department of Labor". To
be considered here also is the amendment striking from this subsection the specific refer-
ence to the appointment by the Board of "regional directors".
It is extremely important to note at the outset that even if the Secretary should yield
on the express amendment requiring her approval for the appointment of personnel, this
would work no change in substance, so long as the Board is "in the Department of Labor",
the Secretary will have complete control of the budgetary allowance, and in this way will
be in a position to dictate not only the salary of specific employees and officers, but also,
and far more important, the purposes for which such employees or officers are to be en-
gaged. With this power, she could deny substantial funds paid regional directors, an ade-
quate staff of field examiners, and an adequate staff of attorneys to assist the Board in the
work at Washington. In this way, by control over the purse-strings, the Secretary has full
power to establish the Board solely as an adjudicating body, or in any other way she sees
fit.
The result is not greatly changed by providing that the Board shall be "in connection
with the Department of Labor". This is a make-shift device in the Executive Order, with-
out precedent in federal law. It has some meaning so long as the Board obtains its funds
through emergency appropriations like that of the NRA, and so long as there is an admin-
istrative arrangement such as that between Mr. Garrison and the Secretary. But if the
Board is to be a permanent agency, its appropriation will necessarily move through the
Departmental budget, and the results above mentioned will ensue. Moreover, an adminis-
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Department also favored a mediation or conciliation approach to labor
disputes. This fit more closely their past experience than did Wagner's
trative "agreement" is subject to repudiation by the Secretary, and to executive action, as
witness the recent difficulty with regard to Executive Order No. 8906. This point is
stressed here because the Secretary has undoubtedly asked for far more than she expected
to get, probably hoping that in the end, without express provision in the bill, she will have
in substance all the powers she presently asks for. There is no question therefore, of a
"compromise", for anything less than a complete divorcement from the Department or
establishment as an independent agency will amount in reality to a complete defeat of our
fundamental policies, as to prestige and independence of personnel and budget, regional
agencies, and mediation.
Summarized briefly, the argument against the Secretary's position is as follows:
(1) The Board must be independent and impartial. The Department's function, in fact and
in the public view, is to look after the interest of labor. The Board could not under these
circumstances have the confidence of industry or the public at large. This is the view taken
by the 20th Century Report, signed by distinguished students, government officials, and
employers.
(2) The Board should be independent of the policies of any particular administration
and free of control by the Executive Departments. This has been the undeviating policy of
Congress when boards of this type have been established with clearly defined powers and
responsibilities. For example, the Interstate Commerce Commission, the Federal Trade
Commission, the Communications Commission, the Securities Exchange Commission, the
National Mediation Board, and agencies more nearly administrative in nature, much as the
Federal Housing Administration, and the Reconstruction Finance Corporation.
(3) The multiplication of functions of cabinet officers has proceeded to a point where
the practical supervision of further agencies would necessarily be exercised by subordi-
nates.
(4) The Board should not be in a department whose function in regard to labor rela-
tions is to mediate and conciliate, for otherwise, there would be an inevitable tendency to
confuse mediation and conciliation in respect to wages, and hours, the present function of
the Conciliation Service, with enforcement of the present law, the function of the new
Board. It is admitted on all sides that you cannot mediate an unfair labor practice. But if
both agencies are in the Department, then it will inevitably come about that mediation will
be attempted first through the conciliation service. This is in fact the view expressed by the
Secretary and even Mr. Davis in their testimony, and is expressly as stated in the commit-
tee report last year, as well as in the language of the Bill itself (requiring all complaints to
clear through the Secretary of Labor). If conciliation is attempted first, no case would
come to the Board except upon a prior record of failure, in an attempt to compromise
rather than vindicate the law. Moreover, there would be duplication of effort and long
delays before a complaint of unfair labor practice finally reached the Board.
(5) The Board must have control of a complaint of unfair labor practice from the very
beginning (see testimony of Leiserson). This requires field agencies, permanently estab-
lished, so that injured parties will know precisely where to turn, and will not be required to
search after a traveling examiner who flits from place to place. Investigations carried on at
the scene of the dispute by conciliators or others in other departments or branches are
futile for the purposes of the Bill, since the report of such investigators cannot be substi-
tuted for the testimony given before the regional agencies of the Board by both parties, and
are not the records contemplated by the Bill to be made the basis of cease and desist orders.
That this is probably the intent of the Secretary's amendment as to regional directors is
indicated by the remarks in the committee report last year that "It is not intended to have
the Board create numerous paid tribunals throughout the country subordinate to it ....
Indeed, Section 5(d) ... emphasizes the importance of utilizing existing agencies of the
Government".
(6) Over-lapping of function as to statistical work is of such minor significance that it
should not be determinative. As for overlapping in regard to mediation and conciliation,
the Board will consent to an amendment similar to that proposed by the Secretary and now
incorporated in Section l(b) of the Executive Order. This amendment might be improved
upon by saying flatly that the Board shall not be authorized to appoint persons to engage in
mediation or conciliation under any circumstances.
Keyserling Papers, supra note 4.
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mixture of mediation and a quasi-judicial labor court, based on his expe-
rience and frustration while Chairman of the National Labor Board.
These general differences with the Labor Department paralleled
Wyzanski's two fundamental objections to Keyserling's drafts. First,
Wyzanski favored an emphasis on labor strikes in language and policy so
as to fit within the Supreme Court's commerce clause precedent under
the antitrust laws. Second, he favored including unfair labor practices
against unions to soften business opposition and seemingly to permit re-
formed company unions.
Wyzanski presented several objections in a February 26, 1934 mem-
orandum to Secretary Perkins,"' the day before the Labor Disputes Act
was introduced. First, he objected to the economic recovery premises of
the preamble and the broad guarantee of organization that eventually
became Section 7 of the NLRA. Second, he objected to the criminaliza-
tion of unfair labor practices, a provision which was dropped before the
bill was introduced. Third, he raised a concern about the wisdom of the
majority rule provision for sole representation in bargaining which had
been patterned on NLB practice.' 19 Fourth, he strongly questioned the
Board's ability both to adjudicate unfair practices and to engage in medi-
ation. Finally, he argued that the parameter of the Board's power to
intervene in unfair practices should be limited to those tending to lead to
disputes burdening interstate commerce.
In a second, similar memorandum dated March 1, 1934, Wyzanski
objected to the closed shop proviso because it failed to adequately protect
minorities against inequitable membership requirements. 120  Wyzanski
also supported the idea of a tripartite Board consisting of labor, manage-
ment, and neutrals. An anonymous memorandum in his files, dated
March, 6, 1934, analyzes each section of the bill, again objecting to the
closed shop proviso and interestingly noting that it allows a vertical (ma-
jority of employees of an employer) rather than a horizontal (majority of
craft) closed shop election.
The Labor Department suggested numerous changes directly to
Senator Wagner before gaining total control over the bill when Senator
Walsh asked Wyzanski for a replacement draft in April. In an undated
118. Wyzanski, Documents Regarding the Origins of the National Labor Relations Act of 1933
[sic] and the Origins of the Policy of Admitting Refugees or other Immigrants upon the Basis of
Affidavits Guaranteeing that they will not Become Public Charges (June 20, 1984) (available at the
Library of Congress and the Project in Labor Theory, University of Miami Law Library).
119. The National Recovery Administration had opposed majority rule. The Department of
Labor generally criticized the Wagner bill's provisions allowing the NLRB discretion to determine
representatives following a supervised election without explicitly requiring majority rule. See I.
BERNSTEIN, supra note 8, at 66.
120. See Wyzanski, supra note 118. This objection is curious, given that all drafts included such
a provision but that the bill upon introduction inexplicably does not. It would seem that reincluding
this provision would not have met serious opposition.
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memorandum,1 2' the Labor Department suggested three changes re-
jected by Keyserling. First, the Department wanted to change the intro-
duction to promote collective bargaining and maintenance of sound
relations between employers and employees. Keyserling thought the
change would create a wedge for the Act to be transformed into compul-
sory arbitration. Second, the Department proposed that the closed shop
provision allow company unions as long as they were not set up through
unfair labor practices. Third, the Department wanted to incorporate
Federal Trade Commission procedures by reference rather than in paral-
lel detailed description. Interestingly, Wagner had by this time agreed to
raise no objection to the suggestion of locating the National Labor Board
in the Labor Department.
The Wyzanski draft, reported out of committee by Senator
Walsh,' 22 began with a short Declaration of Policy eliminating the con-
centration of economic power observation and limited to removing ob-
structions to interstate commerce caused by labor disputes. It defined
coverage to exclude any employer with less than ten employees, included
labor unions acting as employers, and excluded strikers unless on strike
due to an unfair practice. Furthermore, the Wyzanski draft outlawed
four limited unfair labor practices: (1) interference with a general guar-
antee of organizing similar to Section 7(a), (2) interference by employers
with employee rights to organize for collective bargaining, (3) employer
dominance of a union, whether a company or an independent union, and
(4) interference with the membership decision except for the closed shop.
Finally, the Wyzanski draft created a National Labor Board similar
to that of the Wagner draft. Board powers were restricted, and only ini-
tiated by the Secretary of Labor following failed conciliation. There was
no duty to bargain, and employers did not need to sign a closed shop
agreement. Either majority rule or proportional representation could be
certified. Significantly, the right to strike was not explicitly guaranteed,
the drafter preferring instead a parallel to the thirteenth amendment. 12
3
Of course, the thirteenth amendment had never been construed to make
constitutional the right to strike, and thus the statutory language seemed
to be a retreat. Also of importance, Wyzanski's closed shop provision
curiously omitted a restriction on inequitable membership requirements.
Wyzanski had earlier vehemently criticized the Wagner drafts for lacking
such a restriction.
121. Keyserling Papers, supra note 4.
122. For the substitute National Industrial Adjustment Act, see I NATIONAL LABOR RELA-
TIONS BOARD, supra note 4, at 1070.
123. Section 14 of the substitute National Industrial Adjustment Act stated: "Nothing in this
Act shall be construed to require any employee to render labor or service without his consent, or to
authorize the issuance of any order or injunction requiring such service, or to make illegal the failure
of employees collectively, to render labor or service." Id. at 1097.
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The Senate Report Wyzanski wrote to accompany the bill 24 empha-
sized the narrow constitutional justification and the evenhandedness of
promoting both employee and employer organization for collective bar-
gaining. Wyzanski was apparently unconcerned about inequality of bar-
gaining power as a barrier to economic recovery.
In 1935 Wagner's office shut out entirely the Labor Department
from the drafting process. This time, the Labor Department pressed
Congressman Connery to move the NLRB into the Labor Department.
That proposal was then defeated on the House floor.
More than substance separated Keyserling and Wyzanski. For
years, Wyzanski claimed considerable drafting responsibility. Indeed in
his papers he claims to have produced Draft 2(b).' 25 On balance, it is
impossible to tell with whom the original language about specific admin-
istrative provisions originated. 26 Given the Department's positions and
Wyzanski's writing and actions following the bill's introduction, it seems
extremely likely that whatever contributions he made were as a result of
requests from the Senator's office rather than as Labor Department ini-
tiatives. Finally, if Draft 2(b) was indeed written by Wyzanski, the com-
pletely different legal philosophy in his draft for Walsh suggests that the
ideas of Draft 2(b) originated in a group process which was not under his
control.
While at the time Senator Wagner and his aide were crushed by
their defeat in 1934, their stunningly thorough triumph a year later pro-
duced a statute significantly stronger in many respects. The statute re-
vamped procedure and administrative functions with clearer, stronger
statements of unfair labor practices and undivided independent enforce-
ment powers. Moreover, there was a separation of adjudication and me-
diation, elimination of arbitration, and a Board composed entirely of
124. Id. at 1099.
125. I. BERNSTEIN, supra note 8, at 88.
126. Factors favoring Wyzanski's claim include: (1) the draft is done on a different typewriter;
(2) it is the only draft to include a date; (3) the date is bracketed in the style of other papers from his
office; (4) the date, February 19, is a while after Keyserling's first draft dated January 31, and would
leave little time to complete Drafts 3 through 8 prior to February 27; (5) the draft includes no
preamble and no unfair labor practices provision and contains only an administrative apparatus; and
(6) in 1935 Keyserling relied heavily on Phillip Levy for procedural suggestions but completely
excluded Wyzanski.
Factors favoring Keyserling's claim include: (1) the separate file Keyserling maintained on the
Labor Department's suggestions, which contains extensive replies or analysis of the changes by
Keyserling, does not have any comments on this draft; (2) there are differences between this draft
and the bill Senator Walsh asked Wyzanski to draft which would replace Keyserling's draft; (3)
Wyzanski strongly criticized Keyserling's final 1934 draft which included much of Draft 2(b); (4)
Wyzanski had filed this draft among other drafts clearly from Keyserling's office; (5) Draft 2(b)
describes an independent agency, yet Wyzanski had prepared numerous memoranda reciting the
consistent demand of the Labor Department that the National Labor Relations Board be in the
Labor Department; and (6) Wagner kept control over his own legislation and he explicitly desig-
nated the key role in drafting the bill to Keyserling.
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neutrals. Strong explicit guarantees of the right to organize, bargain, and
strike, and the prohibition of company unions gained legal status. In
these features, the experience of the National Labor Board and the old
National Labor Relations Board provided an almost common law basis




Subsequent legislation, principally the Taft-Hartley amendments 127
and the Landrum-Griffin Act, 128 preempt much of the direct application
of the Wagner Act drafts for present statutory construction. Particu-
larly, the addition of unfair union labor practices, 129 an idea expressly
rejected by Wagner and Keyserling, have recast the interpretation of Sec-
tion 7 labor rights. Section 301 and the addition of federal court jurisdic-
tion to enforce the collective agreement 130 have shifted the act's center of
gravity to course of agreement issues. In that sense, the drafts' contents
often indicate roads not taken.131 Furthermore, the draftsmen's primary
concerns aimed at legal recognition and enforcement of collectively or-
ganized bargaining on the one hand, and at redefining and redistributing
economic power within a macroeconomic plan on the other. The domi-
nant emphasis of postwar labor law on the private constitution of the
collective bargain and the rule of arbitration, if it occurred to the drafters
at all, was to be left to the economic power of labor and management.132
Two examples illustrate these postwar shifts in emphasis. First, the
enforcement failures of the NIRA and old NLRB required independent
agency supervision of organization campaigns. The courts were hostile
and the Justice Department skeptical of the lack of priority and waste of
resources in NIRA enforcement actions deemed lost causes. 33 Labor
127. Labor-Management Relations (Taft-Hartley) Act, ch. 120, 61 Stat. 136 (1947) (codified as
amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 141-187 (1982)).
128. Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure (Landrum-Griffin) Act, 73 Stat. 519 (1959)
(codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 401-531 (1982)).
129. See, e.g., National Labor Relations Act § 8 (b)(4), 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(4) (1982).
130. See United Steelworkers v. American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564 (1960); United Steelworkers
v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574 (1960); United Steelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel &
Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593 (1960).
131. The drafters' distrust of federal court involvement led them to excise a proposed provision
for direct resort to district courts to enforce unfair labor practices. See supra note 95 and accompa-
nying text. While that principle survives, it also remains unlikely the drafters would have approved
the whipsaw effects of § 301 contract enforcement. That they did not need to remove what was
never included is simply consistent with their lack of concern over course of contract issues.
132. Compare Feller, supra note 109, with Keyserling in Casebeer, supra note 3, at 331.
133. P. IRONS, supra note 8, at 220-25. In a 1935 memorandum, Keyserling comments:
I need not labor the point that if prosecution is to go through the Department, the purpose
of the bill would be entirely nullified. Sentiment on this point is probably much stronger
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Board supervision of elections and unit determination seemed a faster,
more efficient mechanism. Contemporary administrative procedure, bu-
reaucracy and delay involved in judicial review and enforcement depart
in fact, if not in intent, from speedy government enforcement of organi-
zation. The drafts then parallel the policy behind contemporary efforts
to streamline the organization process.'a 4
Second, the drafters' experiment with, and eventual rejection of the
notion of, nonexclusive representation bargaining with a given em-
ployer 135 may cut several ways regarding contemporary issues of minor-
ity interests and individual grievance proceedings. Present practice treats
the individual interest as subordinate to union or group solidarity
36
whether dealing with divided employee interests, 137 with individual
claims under the duty of fair representation,13 8 or of union-individual
unfairness under Landrum-Griffin. 139 On the one hand, does the Act's
commitment to exclusive representation suggest present practice has
properly reflected the framer's intent? Or on the other hand, does the
possible consideration of multiple units bargaining with a single em-
ployer suggest that the removal of such a possibility occurred for reasons
remotely related to individual interest representation?
In fact, the exclusive representation provision probably reflected
policy judgments only indirectly related to fair representation. First, as a
political judgment about passing the Wagner Act, pressure was brought
to bear by people such as General Hugh Johnson and Donald
Richburg'" to permit employees to choose some forms of company un-
ions-not unions openly dominated by the employer, but limited to a
specific employer or plant. Multiple unit recognition would permit some
employees to choose a bargaining representative relating to a specific lo-
cation, while others could choose'a craft or industry or multi-employer
organization. Of course, this would increase difficulties of enforcement
of unfair labor practices concerning company domination of employee
this year than it was last year, in view of the deplorable record of the Department in 7(a)
cases.
Keyserling Papers, supra note 4; see also supra note 117.
134. See Weiler, Promises to Keep: Securing Workers' Rights to Self Organization Under the
N.L.R.A. 96 HARV. L. REV. 1769 (1983).
135. See infra Drafts 4 and 5, pp. 113 (§ 12(c)) & 115 (§ 12(c) deleted).
136. See Emporium Capwell Co. v. Western Addition Comm. Org., 420 U.S. 50 (1975).
137. Labor-Management Relations Act § 9, 29 U.S.C. § 159(a) (1982). See generally Schatzki,
Majority Rule, Exclusive Representation, and the Interests of Individual Workers: Should Exclusivity
Be Abolished?, 123 U. PA. L. REV. 897 (1975).
138. See generally Finkin, The Limits of Majority Rule in Collective Bargaining, 64 MINN. L.
REV. 183 (1980); Goldberg, The Duty of Fair Representation: What the Courts Do in Fact, 34 BUF-
FALO L. REV. 89 (1985).
139. 29 U.S.C. §§ 411-412 (1982). See generally Summers, The Law of Union Discipline: What
the Courts Do in Fact, 70 YALE L.J. 175 (1960).
140. Johnson and Richburg were the Administrator and General Counsel of the NRA.
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bargaining by permitting many current employee representation plans to
remain in existence with minor cosmetic leadership changes, and perhaps
to suggestively coerce membership choices in that direction rather than
toward an independent union. In Keyserling's view this would have led
to jurisdictional strife.
Second, while the drafters were concerned about minority racial and
ethnic groups,14" ' ultimately, a compromise on this basis would substan-
tially weaken the potential economic power of unions and, therefore, di-
minish the economic recovery rationale behind the Act. Thus, even
governmentally supervised unit certification to assure as fair as possible
union independence from the employer would not serve to maximize
countervailing bargaining strength. This is a much different emphasis on
the need for solidarity than present fears that individual grievance or
interest representation might divide the union, regardless of size, over
bargaining strategy or contract implementation.
142
Collaterally, this drafting concern also partly explains the lack of
more fair representation emphasis in the Wagner Act. After all the Act
did guarantee a right to directly present grievances to management will-
ing to discuss the issues. Senator Wagner and Keyserling believed that
unfair labor practices must be directed solely against employers despite
the political capital given to the Act's opponents in this apparent one-
sidedness. To include union duties to employees, while theoretically fair,
would create legal weapons for employers to hamstring and delay recog-
nition and bargaining, and to encourage company rather than independ-
ent unions. Subsequently, of course, even this avenue for individual
employees has been treated more as a right of management to hear griev-
ances if it wishes, and which it can waive or bargain away over to the
exclusive representative of the bargaining unit.
4 3
This subsequent development represents one of the clearest ironic
deviations from the drafters' intent. When the Department of Labor sug-
gested the addition to Section 9(a) of an individual right to present griev-
ances to their employer, Keyserling enthused:
I am not advised of the purpose of this amendment but its effect is to
limit the operation of the proviso to the majority rule. Thus a closed
shop agreement under Section 8(3) may deprive individuals or minority
groups of the right to present grievances through their own representa-
tives. In view of the fact that the typical activity of company unions is
the presentation of grievances, I think the amendment is excellent, and
141. See Casebeer, supra note 3, at 356.
142. See generally R. FREEMAN & J. MEDOFF, WHAT Do UNIONS Do? (1984); Freed, Polsby &
Spitzer, Unions, Fairness, and the Conundrums of Collective Choice, 56 S. CAL. L. REV. 461 (1983).




should be approved. 144
Finally the drafters' idea of the importance of the right to strike
focused heavily on organization. The problems of strikes during the de-
pression was to them the two edged sword of lost production and battles
over the recognition of bargaining units capable of redistributing wages
to increase consumption. The need was to establish economic power for
labor and thereafter allow the economic weapon of the strike to police
course of bargaining relationship issues.1 45 Taft-Hartley revisions1 4 6 re-
moved important economic weapons, such as secondary boycotts. To-
gether with changes in the enforcement of contracts, this virtually forced
private dispute resolution on the parties. Importantly, this removed the
ability of unions to air their aims and strategies in public forums and
economic arenas. Nor did the contractual model merely limit labor's
economic weapons. It also reduced the power of Board intervention by
limiting enforceable employee interests to contractualized notions of
wage protection. 1
47
Thus, the difference between a labor law regime aimed at structuring
the power relationships of labor and management under the Wagner Act
versus the postwar labor law regime of private governance-arbitration
and the no-strike quid pro quo-renders the attempt to read the drafts of
the Wagner Acts into contemporary constructs of legislative intent ques-
tionable. The drafts may rather suggest critiques of statutory and judi-
cial directions since taken and reminders that an alternative labor law is
conceivable, practicable, and in some sense betrayed.
144. Keyserling Papers, supra note 4.
145. Casebeer, supra note 3, at 353-55. Contrast with the courts' view in NLRB v. McKay
Radio & Telegraph Co., 304 U.S. 373 (1938), and its progeny.
146. See e.g., 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(4) (1982).
147. For the drafters' contrary vision, see Keyserling's rejection of the Department of Labor's
suggestion to strike lines 3 to 7 of § 10(d), and to substitute the following: "... and cause to be
served on such person an appropriate order. Such order may require such person to cease and desist
from such unfair labor practice, to restore a worker to his employment, to pay to him such compen-
sation as he would have received if he had not been wrongfully discharged, and to make reports from
time to [time] ...."
This amendment greatly narrows the scope of the Board's power to make corrective
orders, and should be strongly disapproved. Under the familiar rule of construction, the
stipulation of specific powers or items will be taken to limit the scope of a general grant of
power to those specifically enumerated. The Board will thus be limited, in its orders for
affirmative action, to the reinstatement of employees with back-pay and the making of
compliance reports. Obviously we mean by "restitution" and "affirmative action" a host of
other types of corrective orders which will be adapted to the needs of the individual case.
Reference is had here to the discussion of this point in the "Comments" previously submit-
ted to the committee. The proposed amendment is far more restrictive than the compara-
ble language in the committee draft last year, which read: "or to take such affirmative
action or to perform any other acts that will achieve substantial justice under the
circumstances".
Keyserling Papers, supra note 4.
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VI
SOCIAL CONFLICT IN THE NLRA
One final observation remains. The Act's complexity extended well
beyond its governmental administrative backdrop, as well as beyond the
specific actors' political differences and in-fighting, and beyond the polit-
ical strength of labor and capital as opposing social forces in pitched bat-
tle over the charter of modern labor relations.' 4 Beyond the usual
reasons of interest group compromise, the general nature of the Act's
language encoded social change and social conflict at several levels subse-
quently affecting the Act's history. First, bargaining unit determination
permitted the union movement to develop opposing craft and industry
organizing strategies.
Second, the duty to bargain language of wages, hours and conditions
of employment seemed to channel industrial conflict to wage decisions
rather than control over the nature and processes of work. On the one
hand, the drafters left this language general because they did not intend
to legally impose substantive terms of bargaining. But on the other hand,
they insured that these future social issues would not only appear but
would be decided by force of economic power.1 49
Third, they conceived of labor policy as more than an issue of public
good set against work stoppages and their consequences. Labor should
be concerned about wage rates and benefits as part of national economic
health, encouraging labor's new found interest in channeling state power
to address broader social issues and the post-New Deal Democratic coa-
lition. 5 ' At the same time, the general economic policy was not stated
148. See Wagner, supra note 103; I. BERNSTEIN, supra note 8, at 75 & 100-06. Bernstein sum-
marizes the arguments of proponents and opponents of the Labor Disputes Act, id. at 68-71, and of
the National Labor Relations Act, id. at 100-11.
For a strong but not hysterical argument opposing the National Labor Relations Act, see 1
National Association of Manufacturers, Labor Relations Bulletin, at 3-4 (March 1935). For a less
balanced approach, consider the May 26, 1934 circular of the Illinois Manufacturers Association:
"Wagner Labor Union Dictatorship Bill... The Handling of Industrial Disputes by Labor Boards
Promotes Confusion, Unrest, and Industrial Strife ... In most instances the employers have been
the victims of star-chamber methods .... " Keyserling Papers, supra note 4.
Employees often sent copies of posted management anti-Wagner Act propaganda with notes
such as the following written in the margins:
This circular was sent out in a store mail. We of the laboring class want this bill passed.
The right of collective bargaining belongs to us, but under present set ups it is impossible
for us to be without fear of losing our position. Give the two-thirds buyers of all national
production a break by passing the Wagner Bill.
Id.; see also Casebeer, We of the Laboring Class Want this Bill Passed: Worker's Messages on the
Fight for the Wagner Act in the Files of Leon Keyserling, 1 LAB. HERITAGE issue no. 3 (forthcoming
July 1989).
149. Tomlins argues that the planning function of the Act would primarily be implemented by
the Board imposition of industry-wide bargaining through unit certification. C. TOMLINS, supra
note 8, at 127.
150. Wagner received many messages like this one indicating rank and file labor support for the
Act: "The whole country is looking to the President and you to help us in this crises [of company
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so specifically as to extend beyond wage bargaining and workplace
organization.
Yet, fourth, and skewed from Keyserling's and Wagner's vision to
some extent, the labor statutes became the prototype example of the new
constitutional political order of the postdepression era. This order as-
sumes everyone's liberty became someone else's nuisance, and that every-
one interdependently produces the resources and problems upon which
each person's liberty and welfare depends. At the same time, this insight
does not preempt a bargained private control over society's resources. In
short, the statute has imbricated conflicts simultaneously affecting an ar-
ray of social and political issues and groups, including: the bureau-
cratic-Labor Department versus independent agency; the legal-
adjudication versus mediation; the organizational--craft versus indus-
trial union; the state-privatized versus political planning and the social
wage, and public versus management control over resource investment;
the political-economic-aggregate labor versus capital; and the constitu-
tional-laissez faire versus welfare state versus socialized economic
structure.
CONCLUSION
That all of these social struggles could be mirrored in a discrete
political event of a year and a half speaks of the extraordinary time. That
all of these issues should be connected at some level in the mind of one
actor in position to shape the political outcome must rank as one of the
most remarkable achievements of our legal history. No one ever writes
alone, without history or personal context, but the drafts of Wagner's
Act document Leon Keyserling's singular brilliance and an unmatched
fortuity and import of his political partnership with Robert Wagner.
More deserves to be known of the ideas and actions of these men whose
motto proclaimed: "Men versed in the tenets of freedom will become
restive when not allowed to be free."
15 1
unionism], for I am convinced that we have reached the turning point in the whole recovery pro-
gram. Its success or failure depends upon the results of the action taken on this bill." Letter to
Senator Wagner from the Secretary of Local 234, International Association of Oil Field, Gas Well
and Refinery Workers of America, Chester, Pennsylvania (March 9, 1934) (located in Keyserling
Papers, supra note 4).
151. 79 CONG. REC. 7565, 7570 (1935) (statement by Senator Wagner introducing NLRA on
the Senate floor).
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APPENDIX-DRAFrS
Draft 1 Labor Disputes Act
January 31, 1934
SECTION
(a) No employer shall participate in, supervise, or influence, directly or indi-
rectly, the formation or operation of any organization of any kind when such
organization exists for the purpose, among others, of representing employees in
their efforts to bargain collectively with regard to wages, hours, or other condi-
tions of employment.
(b) In order to make the provisions of the above paragraph effective, it shall be
illegal for any employer:
(1) To establish or maintain any measure of participation in, supervi-
sion of, or influence over the constitution, by-laws, other governing rules,
collection of dues, fees and assessments, and/or elections of any such
organization; (2) to contribute financial support, directly or indirectly, to
any such organization, or to pay, directly or indirectly, the salaries,
wages, or expenses of officers,. agents, representatives, and/or members of
committees of any such organization when engaged exclusively in the
business of such organization; (3) to extend or to withhold special privi-
leges, such as group insurance, donations to relief funds, and the like,
depending upon whether an employee or employees belong or do not be-
long to any such organization; (4) either by written or oral statements, or
by discriminatory practices as to wage and hour differentials, advance-
ment, demotion, job tenure, or any other condition of employment, to
encourage employees to join, or to attempt to dissuade them from join-
ing, any such organization; (5) to solicit and/or maintain lists of names of
employees who are members of any such organization, when such lists
would tend to, or are for the purpose of, administering discipline or
otherwise coercing or influencing employees with respect to membership
or non-membership in any such organization.
Draft 2(a)
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United
States of America in Congress Assembled.
Declaration of Policy
Section 5. Whereas under prevailing economic conditions, employers of
labor are aided by governmental authority to organize into trade groups for the
purpose of cooperative action, and
Whereas the individual unorganized worker is commonly helpless to exer-
cise actual liberty of contract and to protect his freedom of labor, and
Whereas these conditions have tended to create a great disparity in the bar-
gaining power of employers and employees in the processes of bargaining for
terms and conditions of employment,
It is hereby declared to be the policy of Congress to equalize the bargaining
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power of employers and employees, to encourage the making of collective bar-
gaining agreements, and to discourage the use of strikes, lockouts and similar
weapons of industrial strife, as means of composing industrial disputes.
Definitions
Section II. When used in this act and for the purposes of this Act:
First, the term "employer" includes any person (whether acting as an indi-
vidual, or jointly with other individuals or corporations), firm or corporation
who hires any individual or individuals to regularly perform services in the con-
duct of the employer's business; or persons, firms or corporations who are
owned in whole or in part by, or who own, wholly or in part, or who are con-
trolled, directly or indirectly, by, or who control, directly or indirectly, any such
person, firm or corporation, or any association of such persons, firms or
corporations.
Second, The term "employee" as used herein includes every person in the
service of a person, firm, or corporation (subject to the continuing authority of
such person, firm or employer to supervise and direct the manner of rendition of
his service) who regularly performs any work for such employer.
Third, The term "representative" includes a person or persons, labor union,
organization, corporation or unincorporated association.
Fourth, The term "company union" means any group or association of em-
ployees, whether or not the same shall be formally organized, which was so
formed at the suggestion, aid or under the influence of any employer, or its
officers or agents and/or whose constitution or by-laws are under any control or
influence of any employer or its officers or agents and/or whose actions are par-
ticipated in, supervised, controlled by or influenced by any employer, or its of-
ficers or agents.
Fifth, The term "working conditions"
Sixth, The term "National Labor Board" means the National Labor Board
created by this Act.
General Policies
Section III.
First: Employees shall have the right to organize and to join labor organi-
zations, and to bargain collectively through representatives of their own choos-
ing, and to engage in concerted activities for the purpose of choosing and
designating representatives, for the purpose of collective bargaining, and for
other mutual aid or protection.
Second: No employer, its officers or agents shall interfere with, influence,
restrain or coerce its employees, or in any other way attempt to abrogate the
right of its employees to organize, to choose representatives for the purpose of
collective bargaining, to engage in collective or in other concerted activities for
their mutual aid or protection, whether such interference, influence, restraint or
coercion is exercised (a) by requiring employees or anyone seeking employment
to join a company union, or refrain from joining, organizing, or assisting a labor
organization; it being understood, however, that an employer may require any
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one seeking employment, as a condition of employment, to join a labor organiza-
tion to which 75% of his employees belong, provided that such labor organiza-
tion places no inequitable restrictions upon those seeking to join it, or (b) by the
employer's establishing, maintaining, participating in, initiating, supervising, or
influencing, in any manner or degree whatsoever, any organization or associa-
tion composed in whole or in part of its employees, or over the constitution, by-
laws, other governing rules, or elections of such organization, or.(c) by paying or
contributing to any such organization any sums of money or financial support,
whether in the form of compensation for time spent by employees at meetings or
other activities of such organization, or in the form of use of the company prop-
erty or services, or in any other form whatsoever; or (d) by making the extension
or withholding of special privileges to any employee or group of employees de-
pendent upon whether such employee or group of employees belong or do not
belong to any organization of any kind whatsoever; or (e) by the use of differen-
tials of wages or hours, or advancement or demotion, tenure of employment, or
any other condition of employment in such a manner as to differentiate in any
way between employees who belong to any particular organization and those
who do not belong, or between employees who belong to any organization and
those who do not belong to any organization; or (f) by any other means
whatsoever.
Third: It shall be the duty of all employers, their officers, agents and em-
ployees through their duly chosen representatives to exert every reasonable ef-
fort to make and maintain agreements concerning rates of pay, rules, and
working conditions, and to settle all disputes, whether arising out of the applica-
tions of such agreements or otherwise, in order to avoid industrial strife, and
further, to seek the services of the governmental bodies established under this
title for aid in making agreements concerning rates of pay, rules and working
conditions, and for aid in settling disputes, when all other reasonable efforts have
failed.
Fourth: (a) If any dispute shall arise between an employer and its em-
ployees, or between two groups of employees employed by the same employer, as
to who are the duly chosen representatives of such employees, it shall be the
duty of the National Labor Board, upon the request of either party to the dis-
pute, to investigate such dispute and to certify to both parties, in writing, within
thirty days after the invocation of its services, the name or names of the individ-
uals or organizations that have been designated and authorized to represent the
employees involved in the dispute. In such an investigation, the National Labor
Board shall be authorized to take a secret ballot of the employees, or to utilize
any other appropriate method of ascertaining the names of their duly chosen
representatives in such a manner as shall insure the choice of representatives by
the employees without interference, influence, restraint or coercion exercised by
the employer.
(b) Representatives chosen by the majority of the employees eligible to
participate in the choice of representatives, shall, for the purposes of this Act, be
the sole representatives of all of the employees who were eligible to participate in
such choice. In case of any dispute arising as to whether such eligibility shall be
determined on the basis of employer unit, craft unit or plant unit, the National
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Section 301. A Board is created and established, to be known as the Na-
tional Labor Board (hereinafter referred to as the "Board," which shall be com-
posed of five members who shall be appointed by the President, by and with the
advice and consent of the Senate. Two members of the Board shall constitute a
quorum. The first members appointed shall continue in office for the terms of 1,
2, 3, 4, & 5 years respectively from July 1, 1934, the term of each to be desig-
nated by the President, but their successors shall be appointed for terms of five
years, except that any person chosen to fill a vacancy shall be appointed only for
the unexpired term of the member whom he shall succeed. The President shall
designate the Chairman of the Board. No member of the Board shall engage in
any other business, vocation or employment. A vacancy in the Board shall not
impair the right of the remaining members to exercise all the powers of the
Board. The Board shall have an official seal which shall be judicially noticed.
Section 302. (a) Each member shall receive a salary of $10,000 a year,
payable in the same manner as salaries of the judges of the courts of the United
Stites. The Board shall appoint an executive secretary, who shall receive a sal-
ary, payable in like manner, and it shall have authority to employ and fix the
compensation of such attorneys, special experts, examiners, conciliators, clerks
and other employees as it may from time to time find necessary for the proper
performance of its duties and as may be from time to time appropriated for by
Congress. In employing such persons, the Board may act without regard to the
provisions of the civil service laws and without regard to the Classification Act
of 1923 as amended.
(b) The President shall also appoint as associate members, for terms of
one year each, six persons as a panel to represent employers and six persons as a
panel to represent employees. The Board may, in its discretion, from time to
time, invite associate members drawn in equal numbers from each of these
panels to participate in its deliberations, or its findings or its orders; but such
associate members shall not be considered in computing a quorum. Associate
members shall receive $25 per diem and necessary traveling and subsistence ex-
penses when attending meetings of the Board.
(c) All of the expenses of the Board, including all necessary expenses for
* There are two drafts labeled second. This dated draft is substantially identical to sections
labeled first draft accompanying Draft 2(a) which are labeled second draft.
Draft 2(b) has been claimed by Charles Wyzanski to be his work. In a June 20, 1984 letter of
transmission to the Librarian of Congress, the Chairman of the National Labor Relations Board,
and librarians at F.D.R., Columbia, Harvard Law School, Stanford Law School, Yale, and the
Massachusetts Historical Society, Wyzanski provides copies of his files on the Wagner Act. See
supra notes 125-26 and accompanying text.
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transportation incurred by the Board, by the associate members, or by employ-
ees of the Board under its orders in any places other than in the City of Wash-
ington, shall be allowed and paid on the presentation of itemized vouchers
therefore approved by the Board. The General Accounting Office shall receive
and examine all accounts of expenditures of the Board.
Section 303. The principal office of the Board shall be in the District of
Columbia but it may meet and exercise all its powers at any other place. The
Board may, by one or more of its members or by such employees as it may
designate, prosecute any inquiry necessary to its duties in any part of the United
States. A member who participates in such an inquiry shall not be disqualified
from subsequently participating in a decision of the Board in the same case.
Section 304. (a) The Board is empowered and directed to prevent any
person from using any unfair labor practices if that practice has led or tends to
lead to a labor dispute that might burden commerce, or obstruct the free flow of
commerce, or dissipate natural resources, or affect the general welfare.
(b) Whenever the executive secretary (or any person designated by the
Board) from information acquired through any source whatsoever, shall have
reason to believe that any person has been or is using any unfair labor practice
that has led or tends to lead to such a labor dispute, he shall in his discretion
issue and cause to be served upon such person a complaint stating the general
nature of the charges in that respect, and containing a notice of hearing before
either an examiner or the Board at a place therein fixed at least twenty-four
hours after the service of said complaint, provided that the examiner or the
Board shall have discretion to adjourn such hearing from time to time. Said
complaint may be amended by the executive secretary or any member of the
Board at any time prior to the issuance of an order based thereon; and the origi-
nal complaint shall not be regarded as limiting the scope of the inquiry. The
person so complained of shall have the right to file an answer, to appear and give.
testimony at the place and time fixed in the complaint, and to avail himself of
the compulsory process of the Board in summoning witnesses to show cause
why an order relative to any violation disclosed in the complaint or the com-
plaint as amended should not be entered by the Board. Any officer or employee
of the United States, and, in the discretion of the examiner or the Board, any
other person shall be allowed to appear in said proceeding by counsel or in per-
son to present testimony. The examiner or the Board shall have authority to
receive and act upon testimony which would not be competent under rules of
evidence prevailing in courts of law or equity.
(c) The testimony taken by an examiner or the Board shall be authorized
in writing and filed with the executive secretary. Thereafter, in its discretion, the
Board may itself take further testimony and/or hear argument based upon this
summary. If upon all the testimony taken before the examiner and itself, the
Board shall be of the opinion that persons named in the complaint as amended
have used or are using an unfair labor practice that has led or tends to lead to a
labor dispute that might burden commerce, or obstruct the free flow of com-
merce, or dissipate natural resources, or affect the general welfare, then it shall
state its findings as to the facts and shall issue an appropriate order directed to
such persons. Such order may require the person to cease and desist from an
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unfair labor practice, or to take affirmative action, or to pay damages, or to
reinstate employees, or to perform any other acts that will achieve substantial
justice under the circumstances. Such order may further require the respondent
to make a report from time to time showing the extent to which he has complied
with the order. Until a transcript of its findings of fact and its order shall have
been filed in a court, as hereinafter provided, the Board may at any time, upon
such notice and in such manner as it shall deem proper, modify or set aside, in
whole or in part, any finding or order made or issued by it.
(d) If such person fails or neglects to obey such order of the Board while
the case is in effect, the Board may petition the District Court of the United
States, within any district where the unfair labor practice in question was used
or where such person resides or carries on business, or the Supreme Court of the
District of Columbia, for a court order applying the order of the Board, and
shall certify and file with the petition a transcript including a summary of the
evidence, the Board's findings and its own order. Upon such filing of the peti-
tion and transcript, the court shall cause notice thereof to be served upon such
person, and thereupon shall have jurisdiction of the proceeding and of the ques-
tion determined therein, and shall have power to make and enter upon the evi-
dence, findings, and order set forth in such transcript its own order applying,
modifying, or setting aside in whole or in part the order of the Board. No objec-
tion to the order to the Board shall be considered by the court unless such objec-
tion shall have been urged before the Board. The findings of the Board as to the
facts, if supported by evidence, shall be conclusive. If either party shall apply to
the court for leave to adduce additional evidence and shall show to the satisfac-
tion of the court that such additional evidence is material and that there were
reasonable grounds for the failure to adduce such evidence in the hearing before
the Board, the court may order such additional evidence to be taken before the
Board and to be adduced upon the hearing in such manner and upon such terms
and conditions as to the court may seem proper. The Board may modify its
findings as to the facts, by reason of the additional evidence so taken, and it shall
file a summary of each additional evidence and also such modified or new find-
ings, which, if supported by evidence, shall be conclusive, and its recommenda-
tion, if any, for the modification or setting aside of its original order. The
jurisdiction of the court shall be exclusive and its judgment and decrees, apply-
ing, modifying, or setting aside, in whole or in part, any order of the Board, shall
be final, subject to review only by the Supreme Court of the United States in the
manner provided in section 238 of the Judicial Code as amended, United States
Code, Supp. VI, Title 28, section 345. The commencement of proceedings under
this subsection shall not, unless specifically ordered by the court, operate as a
stay of the Board's order.
(e) Any person aggrieved by an order of the Board may obtain a review of
such order in said district court or Supreme Court of the District of Columbia
by filing in such court, within ten days after the entry of such order, a written
petition praying that the order of the Board be modified or be set aside in whole
or in part. A copy of such petition shall be forthwith served upon the Board,
and thereupon the Board shall certify and file in the court a transcript including
a summary of the evidence, the Board's findings of facts and its order as herein-
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before provided. No objection to the order of the Board shall be considered by
the court unless such objection shall have been urged before the Board. The
finding of the Board as to the facts, if supported by evidence, shall be conclusive.
If either party shall apply to the court for leave to adduce additional evidence
and shall show to the satisfaction of the court that such additional evidence is
material and that there were reasonable grounds for failure to adduce such evi-
dence in the hearing before the Board, the court may order such additional evi-
dence to be taken before the Board and to be adduced upon the hearing in such
manner and upon such terms and conditions as to the court may seem proper.
The Board may modify its findings as to the facts, by reason of the additional
evidence so taken, and it shall file such modified or new findings, which, if sup-
ported by evidence, shall be conclusive, and its recommendation, if any, for the
modification or setting aside of the original order. The jurisdiction of the court
shall be exclusive and its judgment and decree, applying, modifying, or setting
aside, in whole or in part, any order of the Board, shall be final, subject to review
only by the Supreme Court of the United States in the manner provided in sec-
tion 238 of the Judicial Code as amended, United States Code, Supp. VI, Title
28, section 345. The commencement of proceedings under this subsection shall
not, unless specifically ordered by the court, operate as a stay of the Board's
order.
(f) The jurisdiction of the district courts and of the Supreme Court of the
District of Columbia to issue orders enforcing, setting aside or modifying orders
of the Board shall be exclusive and shall be subject to review only in the
Supreme Court. No court shall have any jurisdiction to enjoin the Board or an
examiner from taking proceedings and holding hearings under a complaint.
(g) Petitions made pursuant to this statute in the district courts and in the
Supreme Court of the District of Columbia shall be heard expeditiously and if
possible within ten days after they have been docketed.
(h) Complaints, orders and other processes of the Board and its agents
may be served by anyone duly authorized by the Board, either (a) by delivering a
copy thereof to the person to be served, or to a member of the partnership to be
served, or to the president, secretary, or other executive officer, or a director of
the corporation to be served; or (b) by leaving a copy thereof at the principal
office or place of business of such person, partnership, or corporation; or (c) by
registering and mailing a copy thereof addressed to such person, partnership, or
corporation at his or its principal office or place of business; or (d) by sending a
telegraphic copy thereof addressed to such person, partnership, or corporation
at his or its principal office or place of business. The verified return by the per-
son so serving said complaint, order, or other process setting forth the manner of
said service shall be proof of the same, and the return post office receipt or tele-
graph receipt for said complaint, order, or other process registered and mailed
or telegraphed as aforesaid shall be proof of the service of the same.
Section 305: In labor disputes other than those embraced by section 304
the Board shall have power either by itself or through its agents or employees to
hold public hearings to determine whether any person is using any unfair labor
practice and to make public findings based thereon.
Section 306: (a) The Board shall have power to act as arbitrator in labor
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disputes. Whenever all the parties to a labor dispute agree to submit the whole
of it or any part thereof to the arbitration of the Board, and the Board accepts
such submission, the agreement shall be valid, irrevocable and enforceable save
upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract.
(b) In any case accepted by it for arbitration the Board shall have power
to issue an award.
(c) In a case involving a labor dispute that might burden commerce, or
obstruct the free flow of commerce, or dissipate natural resources, or affect the
general welfare, in which the Board has issued an award, any party to the arbi-
tration or the Board itself may within one month thereafter apply to any district
court of the United States for an order confirming the award, and thereupon the
court must grant such an order unless the award is vacated, modified or cor-
rected as prescribed hereafter. Notice of the application shall be served upon the
adverse party by the marshal of any district within which the party may be
found in like manner as any other process of the court, and thereupon the court
shall have jurisdiction of such party as though he had appeared generally in the
proceeding. The court may make an order vacating the award upon the applica-
tion of any party to the arbitration if the Board exceeded its powers or so imper-
fectly executed them that a mutual, final and definite award upon the subject
matter was not made. The court may make an order modifying or correcting
the award upon the application of any party to the arbitration if the Board has
awarded upon a matter not submitted to it unless it is a matter not affecting the
merits of the decision upon the matter submitted or if the award is imperfect in
matter of form not affecting the merits of the controversy. The order may mod-
ify and correct the award so as to effect the intention thereof and promote justice
between the parties. Notice of a motion to vacate, modify or correct an award
must be served upon the adverse party or his attorney within one week after the
award is filed or delivered. Notice of the application shall be served by the mar-
shal of any district within which the adverse party may be found. For the pur-
pose of the motion, any judge who might make an order to stay the proceedings
in an action brought in the same court may make an order, to be served with the
notice of motion, stating the proceedings of the adverse party to enforce the
award. The party moving for an order confirming, modifying, or correcting an
award shall, at the time such order is filed with the clerk for the entry of judg-
ment thereon, also file the following papers with the clerk: (1) an agreement to
arbitrate; (2) the award of the National Labor Board; and (3) such notice, affida-
vit or other paper used upon an application to confirm, modify or correct the
award, and a copy of each order of the court upon such an application. The
order shall be docketed as if it were rendered in a suit in equity and shall have
the same force and effect, in all respects, as, and be subject to all the provisions
of law relating to, a degree in a suit in the court in which it is entered; and it may
be enforced as if it had been rendered in a suit in the court in which it is entered.
Section 307. The Board shall have power in any dispute that may arise
between an employer and his employees, or between two groups of employees
employed by the same employer, as to who are the properly chosen representa-
tives of such employees to investigate such dispute and to certify to both parties,
in writing, the name or names of the individuals or organizations that have been
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designated and authorized to represent the employees involved in the dispute.
In such proceedings the Board shall be authorized to take a secret ballot of the
employees, in such form as it may see fit, or to utilize any other appropriate
method to ascertain the names of their duly chosen representatives. The Board
shall determine whether eligibility to participate in elections shall be determined
by employers unit, craft unit, plant unit, or other appropriate grouping.
Section 308. For the purpose of all hearings and investigations, which, in
the opinion of the Board, are necessary and proper for the enforcement of sec-
tion 304 and also for all proceedings under section 307 that involve labor dis-
putes that might burden commerce, or obstruct the free flow of commerce, or
dissipate natural resources, or affect the general welfare,-
(a) Any member of the Board or any agent or agents designated by it are
empowered to administer oaths and affirmations, take depositions, subpoena wit-
nesses, take evidence, and require the production of any books, papers, or other
documents which the Board deems relevant or material to the inquiry. Such
attendance of witnesses and the production of such documentary evidence may
be required from any place in the United States or any territory at any desig-
nated place of hearing.
(b) In case of contumacy or refusal to obey a subpoena issued to any per-
son, the district courts of the United States, the United States courts of any
territory, and the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia shall severally
have jurisdiction. Any of the said United States courts, within the jurisdiction of
which said person guilty of contumacy or refusal to obey is found or resides,
upon application by the Board may issue to such person an order requiring such
person to appear before the Board, or one of its examiners designated by it, there
to produce documentary evidence if so ordered, or there to give evidence touch-
ing the matter in question; and any failure to obey such order of the court may
be punished by said court as a contempt thereof.
(c) No person shall be excused from attending and testifying or from pro-
ducing books, papers, contracts, agreements, and other documents before the
Board, or in obedience to the subpoena of the Board or any member thereof or
any agent designated by it, or in any cause or proceeding instituted by the
Board, on the ground that the testimony or evidence, documentary or otherwise,
required of him, may tend to incriminate him or subject him to a penalty or
forfeiture; but no individual shall be prosecuted or subjected to any penalty or
forfeiture for or on account of any transaction, matter, or thing concerning
which he is compelled, as having claimed his privilege against self-incrimination,
to testify or produce evidence, documentary or otherwise, except that such indi-
vidual so testifying shall not be exempt from prosecution and punishment for
perjury committed in so testifying.
(d) Witnesses summoned before the Board or one of its examiners desig-
nated by it shall be paid the same fees and mileage that are paid witnesses in the
courts of the United States, and witnesses whose depositions are taken and the
persons taking the same shall severally be entitled to the same fees as are paid
for like services in the courts of the United States.
Section 309. The Board shall have authority from time to time to make,
amend, and rescind such rules and regulations as may be necessary to carry out
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the provisions of this act. Such rules and regulations shall be effective upon
publication in the manner which the Board shall prescribe.
Section 310. Any person who shall assault, resist, prevent, impede, or in-
terfere with any member of the Board or any of its agents in the performance of
his duties in enforcing section 304 or in enforcing section 307 in proceedings that
involve labor disputes that might burden commerce, or obstruct the free flow of
commerce, or dissipate natural resources, or effect the general welfare, shall be
punished by imprisonment for a term of not more than one year, or by a fine of
not more than $5000, or both.
Section 311. If any provision of this act, or the application of such provi-
sion to any person or circumstance, shall be held invalid, the remainder of this
act, or the application of such provision to persons or circumstances other than
those as to which it is held invalid, shall not be affected thereby.
Draft 3**
A Bill
To remove obstructions to interstate commerce, to equalize the bargaining
power of employers and employees, to encourage the amicable settlement of dis-
putes between employers and employees, to create a National Labor Board, and
for other purposes.
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United
States of America in Congress assembled,
Section 8. The tendency of modem industry toward integration and central-
ized control has long since overturned the balance of bargaining power between
the individual employer and the individual employee, and generally has ren-
dered the individual, unorganized worker helpless to exercise actual liberty of
contract, to secure a just reward for his services, and to preserve his standards of
living. As a direct result, the national welfare has failed to keep pace with the
national wealth. The failure of the total volume of wage payments to advance as
fast as production and corporate surpluses has resulted in inadequate purchasing
power, which has accentuated periodic depressions and disrupted the flow of
interstate commerce. Inadequate recognition of the right of employees to bar-
gain collectively through representatives of their own choosing has been one of
the causes precipitating strikes, lockouts, and similar weapons of industrial
strife, with consequent injury to interstate commerce. It is hereby declared to be
the policy of Congress to remove obstructions to the free flow of interstate com-
merce by removing the obstacles which prevent the organization of labor for the
purpose of cooperative action in maintaining their standards of living, by en-
couraging the equalization of the bargaining power of employers and employees,
and by providing agencies for the peaceful settlement of industrial disputes.
Section 9. [The terms "Employer," "Employee," and "Representative" are
substantially the same as Draft 2(a), except that "Employer"] shall not include
employers subject to the Railroad Transportation Act of 1933."
** Drafts 3 to 7 contain no administrative provisions.
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"Organization" shall mean any organization, association or society of any
kind whatsoever composed in whole or in part of employees.
Section 10. Employees shall have the right to engage in concerted activities,
either in labor unions or otherwise, for the purposes of organizing and bargain-
ing collectively through representatives of their own choosing or for other pur-
poses of mutual aid or protection.
Section 11. (a) No employer shall by interference, influence, restraint, favor,
coercion, or in any other manner attempt to abrogate or modify the right of
employees guaranteed in Section 10.
(b) It shall be deemed a violation of the above paragraph for any employer
(1) to initiate, participate in, supervise, or influence, directly or indirectly, the
formation, operations, constitution, by-laws, other governing rules, or elections
of any organization; (2) to contribute financial or other material support or en-
couragement, direct or indirect, to any organization, either by permitting use of
the company property or services, or by compensating anyone for services in
behalf of an organization, or by any other means whatsoever; (3) to make the
extension or withholding of any special privileges whatsoever to any employee
or group of employees dependent upon whether such employee or group of em-
ployees belong or do not belong to an organization; (4) either by written or oral
statements, or by discriminatory practices as to wage and hour differentials, ad-
vancement, demotion, hire, tenure of employment, or any other condition of
employment, to encourage employees to join, or to attempt to dissuade them
from joining or belonging to an organization; (5) to solicit or maintain member-
ship lists of an organization, when such lists would tend to, or are for the pur-
pose of, administering discipline or otherwise coercing or influencing employees
with respect to membership or nonmembership in an organization: Provided,
that nothing in this Act shall prevent an employer from requiring of a person
seeking employment, as a condition of employment, that such person belong to
an organization, when such organization is composed of at least 60 per cent of
such employer's employees and imposes no inequitable restrictions upon
membership.
(c) Any term of a contract or agreement of any kind entered into before
the enactment of this Act which conflicts with the policies or provisions of this
Act is hereby abrogated, and every employer who is a party to such contract or
agreement shall immediately so notify his employees by appropriate action.
Section 12. (a) It shall be the duty of employers to recognize and to bargain
collectively with the representatives designated by employees, and with the orga-
nizations to which these representatives belong, whether these representatives
are or are not employees.
(b) Representatives agreed upon and selected by the majority of employ-
ees participating inthe choice of representatives shall, for the purposes of deal-
ing with employers, be the sole representatives of employees who were eligible to
participate in the choice: Provided, that a quorum for the purpose of making a
choice shall be not less than 60 percent of the employees eligible to participate in
such choice; and Provided further, that no organization which imposes inequita-
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ble restrictions upon membership shall be entitled to represent employees who
are not members thereof.
(d) If any dispute shall arise between an employer and employees or be-
tween two groups of employees, as to who are the properly chosen representa-
tives of employees, it shall be the duty of the National Labor Board, upon the
request of any party to the dispute, to investigate such dispute and to determine
and certify to all parties, in writing, within thirty days after the invocation of its
services, the name or names of the individuals or organizations that have been
designated and authorized to represent the employees involved in the dispute.
Such certification shall be conclusive, for a period designated by the Board but
not to exceed one year, upon the question of representation. In such an investi-
gation, the National Labor Board shall be authorized to take a secret ballot of
employees, or to utilize any other appropriate method of ascertaining the names
of their duly chosen representatives in such a manner as shall insure the choice
of representatives by employees without interference, influence, restraint or coer-
cion exercised by the employer.
(e) In case any dispute arises as to whether eligibility to participate in
elections shall be determined by employer unit, craft unit, plant unit or indus-
trial unit, the National Labor Board, upon the request of any of the parties to
the dispute, shall decide such disputed question.
Section 13. It shall be the duty of all employers and employees through their
duly chosen representatives to exert every reasonable effort to make and main-
tain agreements concerning wages, hours, rules, and other conditions of
employment.
Section 14. Section 7(a) of the National Industrial Recovery Act (approved




Section 9. "Employee" shall mean any person in the service of an employer
(subject to the continuing authority of such employer to supervise and direct the
manner of rendition of his service) who regularly performs any work for such
employer. Wherever the term "employee" is used in this Act, it shall not be
construed to mean the employee of a particular employer, but shall embrace any
employee subject to this Act, unless the Act explicitly states otherwise. Thus, "a
dispute between employer and employees" is not confined to a dispute between
an employer and his employees.
Section 12. (c) Where no representatives have been selected by the majority as
provided in the above paragraph, the representatives chosen by any group of two
or more employees shall represent such group for the purpose of dealing with
employers.
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Draft 5
Changes Only
Section 9. When used in this Act, the term "Employer," except where other-
wise expressly stated, means a person, partnership, association, corporation, or
the legal representative, trustee in bankruptcy, receiver, or trustee thereof, or the
legal representative of a deceased person, who has five or more employees, ex-
cept that the term "employer" shall not include the Federal Government, the
government of the several States, municipal corporations, other governmental
instrumentalities, or any labor organization, or anyone acting in his capacity as
the officer or agent of such labor organization.
"Employee" means any person employed by an employer under any con-
tract of hire, oral or written, express or implied, including all contracts entered
into by helpers and assistants of employees, whether paid by employer or em-
ployee, if employed with the knowledge, actual or constructive, of the employer,
or any prior employee whose stoppage of work has been in consequence, within
a period of three months, of a trade dispute, except that the term employee does
not include persons engaged in the operation of any means of interstate trans-
portation except suburban electric railways and motor vehicles. Wherever the
term "employee" is used, it shall not be construed to mean the employee of a
particular employer, but shall embrace any employee, unless the Act explicitly
states otherwise.
Section 9. [Change from Draft 3] "Organization" shall mean any organiza-
tion, association, corporation or society of any kind in which employees, in
whole or in part, participate to any degree whatsoever, which exists for the pur-
pose, among others, of dealing in any way with the subjects of grievances, dis-
putes, wages, hours, or other conditions of employment.
Section 10. Employees shall have the right to organize and join labor organiza-
tions, and to engage in concerted activities.... [rest of section unchanged from
Draft 3]
[Section 1 l(b) of Draft 3 changes closed shop proviso to 75% of such employer's
employees]
[Section 11(c) of Draft 4 deleted]
Section 12(a). Every employer shall recognize the representatives designated
by employees, and shall make every reasonable effort to make and maintain
agreements with such representatives concerning wages, hours, rules and other
conditions of employment. When such representatives are acting as the agents
of any organization, the employer shall recognize such organization.
(b) Whenever representatives are agreed upon and selected either (1) by
the majority of the employees eligible to participate in the choice or (2) by the
majority of employees participating in the choice when such majority constitute
not less than 40 per cent of those eligible to participate, such representatives
shall, for the purposes of dealing with employers, be the sole representatives of
employees eligible to participate in the choice and of employees who subse-
quently fall within the classification upon which eligibility was based at the time
of the choice: Provided, that no organization which imposes inequitable restric-
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tions upon membership shall be entitled to represent employees who are not
members thereof.
[Section 12(c) of Draft 4 deleted]
[Section 12(d) & (e) of Draft 3 becomes 12(c) & (d)]
[Section 13 of Draft 4 deleted]
Section 13(b) [reintroduced] Any term of a contract or agreement of any kind
entered into before the enactment of this Act which conflicts with the policies or
provisions of this Act is hereby abrogated, and every employer who is a party to




Section 8. The tendency of modem industry toward integration and central-
ized control, hastened by the policy of the government to promote cooperative
activity among trade groups, has long since overturned the balance of bargaining
power between the individual employer and the individual employee, and gener-
ally has rendered the individual, unorganized worker helpless to exercise actual
liberty of contract, to secure a just reward for his services, and to preserve his
standards of living, with consequent detriment to the national welfare and the
flow of commerce. Inadequate recognition of the right of employees to bargain
collectively through representatives of their own choosing has been one of the
causes precipitating strikes, lockouts, and similar weapons of industrial strife,
with consequent injury to interstate commerce and the national welfare. It is
hereby declared to be the policy of Congress to remove obstructions to the free
flow of interstate commerce and to provide for the national welfare by removing
the obstacles which prevent the organization of labor for the purpose of coopera-
tive action in maintaining their standards of living, by encouraging the equaliza-
tion of the bargaining power of employers and employees, and by providing
agencies for the peaceful settlement of industrial disputes.
Section 9. When used in this Act, the term "Person" includes an individual,
partnership, association, corporation, or the legal representative, trustee in bank-
ruptcy, receiver, or trustee thereof, or the legal representative of a deceased
person.
"Employer" means a person who has one or more employees, . . . [balance
of "Employer" same as Draft 5]
"Employee" [same as Draft 5 except] or any such individual whose work
has ceased as a consequence of or in connection with any current labor dispute
or because of any unfair labor practice except that the term employee does not
include individuals covered by the Railway Labor Act (approved May 20, 1926),
as amended from time to time.
Section 11. It shall be an unfair labor practice for
(a) An employer or any person acting in his interest to attempt by inter-
ference, influence, restraint, favor, coercion, or in any other manner, to impair
the right of his employees guaranteed in Section 10.
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(b) An employer to refuse to recognize and/or deal with the representa-
tives of (his) employees or to fail to exert every reasonable effort to make and
maintain agreements with such representatives concerning wages, hours, rules
and other conditions of employment.
[Section 1 l(b)(1) & (2) of Draft 3 becomes 1 (c) & (d)]
Section 11. (e) An employer, by discriminatory practices as to wage and hour
differentials, advancement, demotion, hire, tenure of employment, or any other
condition of employment, to encourage membership or non-membership in an
organization: Provided, that where a contract or agreement of any kind is in
force between an employer and representatives who are not sole representatives
as defined in Section 12, the conditions of employment covered by such contract
or agreement shall not, because of anything contained in this paragraph, compel
an employer to observe similar conditions of employment in his relation with all
his employees.
[Section 1 l(b)(4) of Draft 3 becomes 11 (f)]
[Section 12 [retains only part 12(b) of Draft 5 as the entire section]
Section 13. (a) In any case where the enforcement of the provisions of this
Act would be valid in the absence of section 7(a) of the National Industrial
Recovery Act, the provisions of this Act shall supersede the provisions of section
7(a) of the National Industrial Recovery Act.
(b) Any term of a contract or agreement of any kind entered into in antic-
ipation of the enactment of this Act which conflicts with the policies or provi-
sions of this Act is hereby abrogated, and every employer who is a party to such
contract or agreement shall immediately so notify his employees by appropriate
action. The making of any such contract or agreement within two months of the
enactment of this Act shall be presumed conclusively to have been made in an-
ticipation of this Act.
Draft 7
Changes Only
[Section 11(e) & (f) reordered, proviso of former (f) put in (e)]
Section 13(a). Whenever the provisions of Section 7(a) of the National Indus-
trial Recovery Act are in conflict with the provisions of this Act, the provisions
of this Act shall prevail: Provided, that in any situation where the provisions of
this Act can not be validly enforced, the provisions of said Section 7(a), if appli-




Introduced March 1, 1934
Changes Only
To equalize the bargaining power of employers and employees, to en-
[Vol. 11:73
DRAFTING WAGNER'S ACT
courage the amicable settlement of disputes between employers and employees,
to create a National Labor Board, and for other purposes.
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United
States of America in Congress assembled,
Title One
Section 1. This act may be cited as the "Labor Disputes Act."
Section 2. [preamble same as section 8, Draft 6]
Section 3. [definitions same as section 9, Draft 6, except "employer" excludes
persons subject to the Railway Labor Act; "employee" excludes a person put to
work in place of a striking employee; and as follows]
"Representatives" includes any individual or organization.
"Organization" means any labor union, association, corporation or society
of any kind in which employees participate to any degree whatsoever, which
exists for the purpose, in whole or in part, of dealing with employers concerning
grievances, labor disputes, wages or hours of employment.
"Commerce" means trade or commerce, or any transportation or commu-
nication relating thereto among the several states, or between the District of
Columbia or any territory of the United States and any state or other territory or
between any foreign country and any state, territory, or the District of Colum-
bia, or within the District of Columbia or any Territory, or between points in the
same State but through any other State or any Territory or the District of Co-
lumbia or any foreign nation.
"Unfair labor practices" mean the unfair labor practices listed in section 5.
"National Labor Board" means the *National Labor Board created and es-
tablished by this Act.
Section 4. Employees shall have the right to organize and join labor organiza-
tions, and to engage in concerted activities, either in labor unions or otherwise,
for the purposes of organizing and bargaining collectively through representa-
tives of their own choosing or for other purposes of mutual aid or protection.
Section 5. It shall be an unfair labor practice for an employer, or anyone acting
in his interest, directly or indirectly
(a) To attempt, by interference, influence, restraint, favor, coercion, lock-
out or in any other manner, to impair the right of employees guaranteed in
Section 10.
(b) To refuse to recognize and/or deal with the representatives of his em-
ployees or to fail to exert every reasonable effort to make and maintain agree-
ments with such representatives concerning wages, hours, and other conditions
of employment.
(c) To initiate, participate in, supervise, or influence the formation, consti-
tution, by-laws, other governing rules, operations, policies, or elections of any
organization.
(d) To contribute financial or other material support to an organization
by compensating anyone for services performed in behalf of an organization, or
by any other means whatsoever.
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(e) To use discriminatory practices as to wage or hour differentials, ad-
vancement, demotion, hire, tenure of employment, or any other condition of
employment, which encourage membership or non-membership in any organiza-
tion: Provided, that where a contract or agreement of any kind is or shall be in
force between an employer and a group of employees whose representatives are
not sole representatives as defined in Section 7, the provisions of such contract
or agreement regarding conditions of employment shall not, because of anything
contained in this subsection, compel an employer to observe similar conditions
of employment in his relations.with all his employees.
Provided, however, that nothing in this Act shall preclude the making of a
contract, when such contract does not cover a period longer than one year, be-
tween an employer and an organization, which requires a person seeking em-
ployment, as a condition of employment, to join such organization, when no
attempt is made to influence such organization by any unfair labor practice, and
when such organization is composed of at least a majority of such employer's
employees and imposes no inequitable restrictions upon its members or upon
admissions to membership.
Section 6. (a) Any unfair labor practice that burdens or affects commerce, or
obstructs the free flow of commerce, or has led or tends to lead to a labor dispute
that might affect or burden commerce, or obstruct the free flow of commerce,
shall be a misdemeanor and upon conviction thereof an offender shall be fined
not more than $500 for each offense, and each day such violation continues shall
be deemed a separate offense.
(b) The several district courts of the United States are hereby invested
with jurisdiction to prevent and restrain any unfair labor practice that burdens
or affects commerce, or obstructs the free flow of commerce, or has led or tends
to lead to a labor dispute that might affect or burden commerce, or obstruct the
free flow of commerce, and it shall be the duty of the several district attorneys of
the United States, in their respective districts, under the direction of the Attor-
ney General, upon the request of the National Labor Board, to institute proceed-
ings in equity to prevent and restrain any such unfair labor practices; but
nothing in this title shall be construed to impair the powers of the National
Labor Board under title two of this Act.
Section 7. Whenever representatives are agreed upon and selected either (1) by
the majority of the employees eligible to participate in the selection or (2) by the
majority of employees participating in the selection when such majority consti-
tute not less than 40 per cent of those eligible to participate, such representatives
shall, for the purposes of collecting bargaining, be the sole representatives of
employees eligible to participate in the selection and of employees who subse-
quently fall within the classification upon which eligibility was based at the time
of the selection: Provided, that no organization which imposes inequitable re-
strictions upon membership shall be entitled to represent employees who are not
members thereof.




Section 201. A Board is created and established, to be known as the Na-
tional Labor Board (hereinafter referred to as the "Board"), which shall be com-
posed of five members, of whom one shall be appointed and designated as a
representative of employers, one as a representative of employees, and three as
representatives of the public. One of the three public representatives shall be
appointed and designated as Chairman of the Board. All members shall be ap-
pointed and designated by the President, by and with the consent of the Senate.
Two members of the Board shall constitute a quorum, but neither the represen-
tative of employers nor the representative of employees shall participate in any
function of the Board unless the other is likewise participating. The first mem-
bers appointed shall continue in office for terms of 1, 2, 3, 4, and 5 years respec-
tively from July 1, 1934, the term of each to be designated by the President, but
their successors shall be appointed for terms of five years, except that any person
chosen to fill a vacancy shall be appointed only for the unexpired term of the
member whom he shall succeed. [balance of section identical to section 301,
Draft 2(b).]
Section 202. [balance of section identical to section 302, Draft 2(b).] The
Board is directed to retain the officers and employees of the National Labor
Board created by the President on August 5, 1933 to the fullest extent consistent
with the efficient functioning of the Board.
Section 203. [identical to section 303, Draft 2(b).]
Section 204. (a) The Board shall have power, either itself or through its
agents, to act as conciliator or mediator in any labor dispute, and to offer its
services, whenever desirable, to the parties to any labor dispute, and to attempt
to adjust such dispute by conciliation or mediation: Provided, that the Board
may decline to take cognizance of labor disputes where there is another available
means of settlement provided for by agreement, industrial code, or law which
has not been utilized, and where such means of settlement would not involve any
acquiescence in any unfair labor practice. The Board shall have power to make
public the findings and results of conciliation or mediation in which it engages.
(b) The Board shall have the power, in any labor dispute, to hold public
hearings and to make public findings based thereon.
Section 205. (a) The Board is empowered to prevent any person from
using any unfair labor practice that burdens or affects commerce, or obstructs
the free flow of commerce, or has led or tends to lead to a labor dispute that
might burden or affect commerce, or obstruct the free flow of commerce;
(b) Whenever any member of the Board, or the executive secretary, or any
person designated by the Board, from information acquired through any source
whatsoever, shall have reason to believe that any person has been or is using any
such unfair labor practice, . . . [balance of Title II is substantially the same as the
balance of Draft 2(b), with some simplication of language and with the excep-
tion of: (1) removal of section 305, Draft 2(b); (2) addition of section 208(e).]
Section 207. (a) In any disputes that may arise between an employer and
his employees, or between groups of employees, as to who are the representatives
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of such employees the Board, if the dispute might burden or affect commerce, or
obstruct the free flow of commerce, may investigate such dispute and certify to
both parties, in writing, the name or names of the individuals or organizations
that have been designated and authorized to represent the employees involved in
the dispute. In such an investigation, the Board shall be authorized to take a
secret ballot of employees, or to utilize any other appropriate method to ascer-
tain their representatives. The Board shall determine whether eligibility to par-
ticipate in elections shall be determined on the basis of employer unit, craft unit,
plant unit, or other appropriate grouping.
(b) In disputes that arise between an employer and employees, or between
groups of employees, as to who are the representatives of such employees, the
Board, if the dispute is not of the character described in subsection (a), may offer
its services to ascertain who are the employees' representatives.
Section 208(e). The Board is empowered to secure information from any
Department of the government when such information is relevant to the Board's
inquiry.
Title III
Section 301. There is hereby created in the Department of Labor the
United States Conciliation Service, under the direction of a Director of Concilia-
tion. The Secretary of Labor shall appoint such Director and shall have author-
ity to employ and fix the compensation of such commissioners of conciliation,
clerks, and other employees as he may from time to time find necessary for the
proper performance of the duties of the service, and as may be from time to time
appropriated for by Congress. In employing such persons, the Secretary of La-
bor may act without regard to the provisions of the Civil Service laws and with-
out regard to the Classification Act of 1923, as amended.
Section 302. It shall be the duty of the United States Conciliation Service
to offer its services, whenever desirable, to the parties to any labor dispute, and
to attempt to adjust such dispute by conciliation or mediation. Nothing in this
Title shall limit the power given to the Secretary of Labor under the Act of
March 4, 1913, chapter 141, § 8, 37 Stat. 738, U.S.C. Title 5, Section 619.
Section 303. Nothing in this Act shall be construed so as to interfere with
or impede or diminish in any way the right to strike.
NLRA Draft 1
November, 1934
Modified from last Wagner version of Labor
Disputes Act, May 5, 1934
A BILL
To equalize the bargaining power of employers and employees, to promote
the amicable settlement of labor disputes, to create a National Labor Board, and
for other purposes.
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States




SECTION 1. Under prevailing economic conditions, developed with the
aid of governmental authority, owners of property are organized in the corpo-
rate and other forms of ownership and trade associations, and the individual
unorganized worker, or the worker whose concerted activities are not free from
the domination and control of his employer, is commonly helpless to exercise
actual liberty of contract and to protect his freedom of labor, and thereby to
obtain acceptable terms and conditions of employment and preserve a decent
standard of living, with consequent detriment to the general welfare and free
flow of commerce. Inadequate recognition of the right of employees to bargain
collectively and freely through representatives of their own choosing has forced
them to attempt to preserve their standards of living by strikes and similar mani-
festations of economic strife, thus obstructing commerce and imperiling the gen-
eral welfare. It is hereby declared to be the policy of the United States to remove
unnecessary obstructions to the free flow of commerce, to encourage the estab-
lishment of uniform labor standards, and to provide for the general welfare, by
establishing agencies for the peaceful settlement of labor disputes, and by pro-
tecting the exercise by the worker of full freedom of association, self-organiza-
tion, and designation of representatives of his own choosing, for the purpose of
negotiating the terms and conditions of his employment or other mutual aid or
protection.
Definitions
SEC. 2. When used in this Act-
(1) The term "person" includes one or more individuals, partnerships, as-
sociations, corporations, legal representatives, trustees, trustees in bankruptcy,
or receivers.
(2) The term "employer" includes any person acting in the interest of an
employer, directly or indirectly, but shall not include the United States, or any
State, municipal corporation, or other governmental instrumentality, or any per-
son subject to the Railway Labor Act, as amended from time to time, or any
labor organization, or anyone acting in the capacity of officer or agent of such
labor organization.
(3) The term "employee" shall include any employee, and shall not be
limited to the employees of a particular employer, unless the Act explicitly states
otherwise, and shall include any individual whose work has ceased as a conse-
quence of, or in connection with, any current labor dispute or because of any
unfair labor practice, and who has not obtained any other regular employment,
but shall not include any individual employed as an agricultural laborer, or in
the domestic service of any family or person at his home, or any individual em-
ployed by his father, mother, or spouse.
(4) The term "representatives" includes any individual or labor
organization.
(5) The term "labor organization" means any organization of any kind or
any agency or employee representation committee or plan in which employees
participate and which exists for the purpose, in whole or in part, of dealing with
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employers concerning grievances, labor disputes, rates of pay, or hours of
employment.
(6) The term "commerce" means trade or commerce, or any transporta-
tion or communication relating thereto, among the several States, or between the
District of Columbia or any Territory of the United States and any State or
other Territory, or between any foreign country and any State, Territory, or the
District of Columbia, or within the District of Columbia or any Territory, or
between points in the same State but through any other State or any Territory or
the District of Columbia or any foreign country.
(7) The term "unfair labor practice" means any unfair labor practice
listed in section 8.
(8) The term "affecting commerce" means in commerce, or burdening or
affecting commerce, or obstructing the free flow of commerce, or having led or
tending to lead to a labor dispute that might burden or affect commerce or ob-
struct the free flow of commerce.
(9) The term "labor dispute" includes any controversy concerning terms
or conditions of employment, or concerning the association or representation of
persons in negotiating, fixing, maintaining, changing, or seeking to arrange
terms or conditions of employment, regardless of whether or not the disputants
stand in the proximate relation of employer and employee.
(10) The term "National Labor Relations Board," means the National
Labor Relations Board created by section 3 of this Act.
(11) The term "old Board" means the National Labor Relations Board
established by the President in July 1934.
NATIONAL LABOR BOARD
SEC. 3. (a) There is hereby created as an independent agency in the Exec-
utive branch of the government, a board, to be known as the "National Labor
Relations Board" (hereinafter referred to as the "Board"), which shall be com-
posed of three members, who shall be appointed by the President, by and with
the advice and consent of the Senate. One of these members shall be appointed
for a term of one year, one for a term of three years, and one for a term of five
years, but their successors shall be appointed for terms of five years each, except
that any individual chosen to fill a vacancy shall be appointed only for the
unexpired term of the member whom he shall succeed. The President shall des-
ignate one member to serve as Chairman of the Board.
(b) A vacancy or vacancies in the Board shall not impair the right of the
remaining member or members to exercise all the powers of the Board, and the
majority of the existing Board shall, at all times, constitute a quorum. The
Board shall have an official seal which shall be judicially noticed.
SEC. 4. (a) Each member of the Board shall receive a salary of $10,000 a
year, shall be eligible for reappointment, and shall not engage in any other busi-
ness, vocation or employment. The Board shall appoint such employees, and,
without regard for the provisions of the civil-service laws or the Classification
Act of 1923, as amended, appoint and fix the compensation of an Executive
Secretary, Assistant Executive Secretaries, and such attorneys, special experts,
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examiners, regional directors and mediators as may be from time to time appro-
priated for by Congress. The Board may establish or utilize such regional, local,
or other boards, voluntary and uncompensated services, as it may from time to
time find necessary.
(b) Upon the organization of the Board and the designation of its chair-
man, the old Board shall cease to exist; and all pending investigations and pro-
ceedings of the old Board shall be continued by the Board. All employees of the
old Board shall be transferred to and become employees of the Board at their
present grades and salaries. All records, papers, and property of the old Board,
and all unexpended funds and appropriations for the use and maintenance of the
old Board, shall become funds and appropriations available to be expended by
the Board in the exercise of the powers, authority, and duties conferred on it by
this Act.
(c) All of the expenses of the Board, including all necessary traveling and
subsistence expenses outside the District of Columbia incurred by the members
or employees of the Board under its orders, shall be allowed and paid on the
presentation of itemized vouchers therefore approved by the Board or by any
individual it designates for that purposes.
SEC. 5. The principal office of the Board shall be in the District of Co-
lumbia, but it may meet and exercise all its powers at any other place. The
Board may, by one or more of its members or by such agents or agencies as it
may designate, prosecute any inquiry necessary to its functions in any part of the
United States. A member who participates in such an inquiry shall not be dis-
qualified from subsequently participating in a decision of the Board in the same
case.
SEC. 6. (a) The Board shall have authority from time to time to make,
amend, and rescind such rules and regulations as may be necessary to carry out
the provisions of this Act. Such rules and regulations shall be effective upon
publication in the manner which the Board shall prescribe.
(b) [Note by Keyserling: Dictated.]
UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES
SEC. (7). [Note by Keyserling: to be dictated]
SEC. (8). It shall be an unfair labor practice for an employer-
(1) To attempt, by interference, restraint, or coercion, to impair the exer-
cise by employees of the rights guaranteed in section 7.
(2) To dominate or interfere with the administration of any labor organi-
zation or contribute financial or other support to it: Provided, that subject to
rules and regulations prescribed by the Board, an employer shall not be prohib-
ited from permitting employees, or their representatives, from conferring with
him during working hours without loss of time or pay.
(3) By discrimination in regard to hire or tenure of employment or any
term or condition of employment, or by contract or agreement, to encourage or
discourage the exercise by employees of the rights guaranteed in section 7: Pro-
vided, that nothing in this Act, or in the National Industrial Recovery Act or in
any code or agreement approved thereunder, or in any other statute of the
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United States, shall preclude an employer from making an agreement with a
labor organization to-require as a condition of employment membership in such
labor organization if the agreement is sought by the majority of the employees in
a unit covered by it when made.
(4) To discharge, demote or otherwise discriminate against an employee
because he has filed charges or given testimony under this Act.
(5) To refuse to bargain collectively with the representatives of his
employees.
Representatives & Elections
Sec. 9(a) Representatives designated or selected for the purposes of collec-
tive bargaining by the majority of the employees in the unit appropriate for such
purposes, shall be the exclusive representatives of the entire unit for the purposes
of collective bargaining in respect to rates of pay, hours of employment, and
other basic conditions of employment: Provided, however, that any minority
group of employees in an appropriate unit shall have the right to bargain collec-
tively through representatives of their own choosing when no representatives
have been designated or selected by a majority in such unit: and Provided fur-
ther, that nothing in this section shall prevent any individual or minority group
of employees at any time from having representatives of their own choosing to
present grievances to their employer, or from engaging in self-organization for
their mutual protection or benefit.
(b) In any dispute affecting commerce as to who are the representatives of
employees, the Board may investigate such dispute and certify to the parties, in
writing, the name or names of the representatives that have been designated or
selected. In any such investigation, the Board shall hold an appropriate hearing,
either in conjunction with a proceeding under section 9 or otherwise, and the
Board shall be authorized to take a secret ballot of employees, or to utilize any
other suitable method to ascertain such representatives. The Board shall decide
whether, in order to effectuate the purposes of this Act, the appropriate unit for
the purposes of collective bargaining shall be the employer unit, craft unit, plant
unit, or other appropriate unit.
(c) Whenever an order of the Board made pursuant to Section 10(d) is
based in whole or in part upon facts certified following an investigation pursuant
to subsection (b) of this section, and there is a petition for the enforcement or
review of such order, such certification and the record of such investigation shall
be included in the transcript of the entire record required to be filed under sub-
sections 10(f) or 10(g), and thereupon the decree of the court affirming, modify-
ing, or setting aside in whole or in part the order of the Board, shall be made and
entered upon the pleadings, testimony, and proceedings set forth in such
transcript:
PREVENTION OF UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES
SEC. 10. (a) The Board is empowered, as hereinafter provided, to pre-




(b) The Board may, in its discretion, decline to exercise jurisdiction over
any such unfair labor practice in any case where there is another means of ad-
justment or prevention, provided for by agreement, industrial code or law,
which has not been utilized. But in any case where the Board has so declined,
the Board may at any time institute proceedings under this Act or exercise
power of review in order to assure the effectuation of the policy of this Act and
the development of a uniform body of administrative interpretation and practice
thereunder.
(c) Whenever the Board shall have reason to believe that any person has
engaged in or is engaging in any such unfair labor practice, it shall issue and
cause to be served upon such person a complaint stating the charges in that
respect, and containing a notice of hearing before the Board or before a desig-
nated agent or agency, at a place therein fixed, not less than three days after the
serving of said complaint. Any such complaint may be amended by the Board in
its discretion at any time prior to the issuance of an order based thereon. The
person so complained of shall have the right to file an answer and to appear by
counsel or in person and give testimony at the place and time fixed in the com-
plaint, and to invoke the compulsory process of the Board in summoning wit-
nesses in its behalf. In the discretion of the agent or agency conducting the
hearing or the Board, any other person may be allowed to appear in the said
proceeding by counsel or in person to present testimony. In any such proceed-
ing the rules of evidence prevailing in courts of law or equity shall not be
controlling.
(d) The testimony taken by such agent or agency or the Board shall be
reduced to writing and filed with the Board. Thereafter, in its discretion, the
Board may itself take further testimony and/or hear argument. If upon all the
testimony taken, the Board shall be of the opinion that any person named in the
complaint has engaged in or is engaging in any such unfair labor practice, then
the Board shall state its findings of fact and shall issue and cause to be served on
such person an order requiring such person to cease and desist from such unfair
labor practice, and to take affirmative action or perform any other acts that will
effectuate the purposes of this Act. Such order may further require such person
to make a report from time to time showing the extent to which it has complied
with the order.
(e) Until a transcript of the record in a case shall have been filed in a
court, as hereinafter provided, the Board may at any time, upon such notice and
in such manner as it shall deem proper, modify or set aside, in whole or in part,
any finding or order made or issued by it.
(f) If such person fails or neglects to obey such order of the Board while
the same is in effect, the Board may petition any District Court of the United
States within any district wherein the labor practice in question occurred or
wherein such person resides or carries on business, or the Supreme Court of the
District of Columbia, for the enforcement of such order and for appropriate
temporary relief, and shall certify and file in the court a transcript of the entire
record in the proceeding, including the testimony upon which such order was
entered and the findings and order of the Board. Upon such filing, the court
shall cause notice thereof to be served upon such person, and thereupon shall
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have jurisdiction of the proceeding and of the question determined therein, and
shall grant such temporary relief or restraining order as it deems just and proper
and shall make and enter upon the pleadings, testimony, and proceedings set
forth in such transcript a decree affirming, modifying, or setting aside in whole
or in part the order of the Board. No objection that has not been urged before
the Board shall be considered by the court, unless the failure or neglect to urge
such objection shall be excused because of extraordinary circumstances. The
findings of the Board as to the facts, if supported by evidence, shall be conclu-
sive. If either party shall apply to the court for leave to adduce additional evi-
dence and shall show to the satisfaction of the court that such additional
evidence is material and that there were reasonable grounds for the failure to
adduce such evidence in the hearing before the Board, the court may order such
additional evidence to be taken before the Board and to be adduced upon the
hearing. The Board may modify its findings as to the facts, or make new find-
ings, by reason of additional evidence so taken and filed, and it shall file such
modified or new findings, which, if supported by evidence, shall be conclusive,
and shall file its recommendations, if any, for the modification or setting aside of
its original order. The jurisdiction of the court shall be exclusive and its judg-
ment and decree shall be final, except that the same shall be subject to review by
the appropriate Circuit Court of Appeals or the Court of Appeals of the District
of Columbia, and by the Supreme Court of the United States upon writ of certio-
rari or certification as provided in sections 239 and 240 of the Judicial Code, as
amended (U.S.C., title 28, secs. 346 and 347). The commencement of proceed-
ings under this subsection shall not, unless specifically ordered by the court,
operate as a stay of the Board's order.
(g) Any person aggrieved by an order of the Board granting or denying in
whole or in part the relief sought may obtain a review of such order in any
District Court of the United States in the district wherein the unfair labor prac-
tice in question was engaged in or wherein such person resides or carries on
business, or in the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia, by filing in such
court a written petition praying that the order of the Board be modified or set
aside. A copy of such petition shall be forthwith served upon the Board, and
thereupon the aggrieved party shall file in the court a transcript of the entire
record in the proceeding, certified by the Board, and including the testimony
upon which the order complained of was entered and the findings and order of
the Board. Upon such filing, the Board may file a petition for enforcement of
such order, and the court shall have the same jurisdiction, and shall proceed in
the same manner, as in the case of the application by the Board under sub-
section (f), and the findings of the Board as to the facts, if supported by evi-
dence, shall in like manner be conclusive.
(h) When making and entering a decree affirming, modifying, or setting
aside in whole or in part an order of the Board as provided in this section, the
jurisdiction of courts sitting in equity shall not be limited by the Act entitled,
"An Act to amend the Judicial Code and to define and limit the jurisdiction of
courts sitting in equity, and for other purposes," approved March 23, 1932
(U.S.C., title 29, secs. 101-115).
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(i) Petitions filed under this Act shall be heard expeditiously, and if possi-
ble within ten days after they have been docketed.
(j) Complaints, orders, and other process and papers of the Board and its
agents may be served either personally or by registered mail or by telegraph or
by leaving a copy thereof at the principal office or place of business of the person
required to be served. The verified return by the individual so serving the same
setting forth the manner of such service shall be proof of the same, and the
return post office receipt or telegraph receipt therefore when registered and
mailed or telegraphed as aforesaid shall be proof of service of the same.
Section 11 [Note by Keyserling: dictated.]
ARBITRATION
Sec. 12(a) The Board shall have power to act and to appoint any person,
agent or agency to act as arbitrator in labor disputes, when parties agree to
submit the whole or any part of a labor dispute to the arbitration of the Board or
its appointees. A provision in a written contract or a written agreement to sub-
mit to the arbitration of the Board or its appointees, when accepted by the Board
after the dispute has arisen, shall be valid and irrevocable as to the parties of the
agreement, save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation
of any contract. If any party fails, neglects or refuses to perform under such
contract or submission, the Board, its agents or appointees, may nevertheless, in
the discretion of the Board, proceed to hear the case ex parte, and the Board, its
agent or appointees, shall have the power to issue an award applicable to the
submitting parties.
(b) The Board shall issue and promulgate rules for the conduct of arbitra-
tion and an agreement to submit to the arbitration of the Board, or its appoin-
tees or its agents, shall be deemed consent to the proceeding being conducted in
accordance with such rules then obtaining unless otherwise specified in the arbi-
tration contract or submission. An agreement to submit to the Board shall au-
thorize the Board to appoint agents to hear the testimony, and in the discretion
of the Board, to render a decision in the name of the Board on the findings thus
presented, unless otherwise specified in the agreement. The Board may, how-
ever, in its discretion, render a decision on testimony taken before its agents.
(c) In any dispute in which an award has been made, the Board shall file
the award in the Clerk's Office of the United States District Court that has been
agreed upon by the parties, or, in default of such agreement, that of the Supreme
Court of the District of Columbia. Notice of the filing shall be personally served
or sent by registered mail to each submitting party. Unless a petition to impeach
the award on the grounds hereinafter set forth shall be filed in the Clerk's Office
of the Court in which the award has been filed, the Court shall enter judgment in
accordance with the terms of the award: provided that no employee shall be
compelled to render personal services without his consent.
(d) A petition for the impeachment of any award may be filed only in the
court where the award has been filed and not more than ten (10) days after the
communication of notice of the filing of the award to the submitting parties.
Notice of filing of such petition shall be served personally or sent by registered
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mail to each submitting party. The petition shall be sustained by the court only
on one or more of the following grounds:
(1) That the proceedings were not substantially in conformity with the
provisions of the arbitration agreement or rules adopted for the conduct of the
arbitration.
(2) That an arbitrator or member of the Board participating in the award
was guilty of fraud or corruption; or that a party to the award practiced fraud or
corruption which affected the result, provided further that partisanship known,
or which by the exercise of due care, should have been known, by a party prior
to the arbitration proceeding, shall not constitute fraud to which he may avail
himself within the meaning of this section.
(e) The court shall not set aside an award on the ground that it is invalid
for uncertainty: In such case, the court shall suspend action pending the resub-
mission of said award to the Board for interpretation.
(f) Where there was an evident material miscalculation of figures, or an
evident material mistake in the description of any person, thing, or property
referred to in the award, or where the arbitrators have awarded on a matter not
submitted to them, unless it is a matter affecting the merits of the decision on the
matters submitted or where the award is imperfect in the matter of form in
affecting the matter of the controversy, the court shall modify and correct the
award so as to effect the intent thereof and promote justice between the parties,
and thereupon shall enter judgment in accordance with Section .
(g) The court shall construe every award with a view to favoring its valid-
ity. If the court shall determine that a part of the award is invalid on some
ground or grounds designated in this section as a ground of invalidity, but that a
part of the awardis valid, the court shall nevertheless enter judgment upon such
part or parts of the award as are valid unless such part or parts are inseparable
from the remainder of the award, in which case the entire award shall be
vacated.
(h) If the petition for impeachment of the award is not sustained, the
court shall enter judgment in accordance with the terms of the award subject to
the provisos of Section . Where a petition for the impeachment of an award is
granted, the award shall be vacated, and the court shall -remand the arbitration
to the Board, which may, in its discretion, accept the case for resubmission to
arbitration in accordance with the terms of the original agreement or with such
modifications as the Board deems fit, or it may refuse to take any further action
regarding it.
INVESTIGATORY POWERS
SEC. 13. For the purpose of all hearings and investigations, which, in the
opinion of the Board, are necessary and proper for the exercise of the powers
vested in it by section 9, section 10, and section 12 (in any dispute affecting
commerce)-
(1) The Board, or its duly authorized agent or agents, shall at all reason-
able times have access to, for the purpose of examination, and the right to copy
any written or printed evidence of any person being investigated or proceeded
against that relates to any question under investigation. Any member of the
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Board shall have power to require by subpoena the attendance and testimony of
witnesses and the production of any written or printed evidence that relates to
any question under investigation. Any member of the Board, or any agent desig-
nated by the Board for such purposes, may administer oaths and affirmations,
examine witnesses, and receive evidence. Such attendance of witnesses and the
production of such written or printed evidence may be required from any place
in the United States or any Territory or possession thereof, at any designated
place of hearing.
(2) In case of contumacy or refusal to obey a subpoena issued to any per-
son, any District Court of the United States, the United States courts of any
Territory or possession, within the jurisdiction of which the inquiry is carried on
or within the jurisdiction of which said person guilty of contumacy or refusal to
obey is found or resides or carries on business, and the Supreme Court of the
District of Columbia, upon application by the Board shall have jurisdiction to
issue to such person, wherever he resides or is found, an order requiring such
person to appear before the Board, or an agent designated by it, there to produce
written or printed evidence if so ordered, or there to give testimony touching the
matter in question; and any failure to obey such order of the court may be pun-
ished by said court as a contempt thereof.
(3) No person shall be excused from attending and testifying and from
producing books, papers, agreements, documents, or written or printed evidence
before the Board, or in obedience to the subpoena of the Board, on the ground
that the testimony or written or printed evidence required of him may tend to
incriminate him or subject him to a penalty or forfeiture; but no individual shall
be prosecuted subjected to any penalty or forfeiture for or on account of any
transaction, matter, or thing concerning which he is compelled, after having
claimed his privilege against self-incrimination, to testify or produce written or
printed evidence, except that such individual so testifying shall not be exempt
from prosecution and punishment for perjury committed in so testifying.
(4) Witnesses summoned before the Board or any of its agents shall be
paid the same fees and mileage that are paid witnesses in the courts of the
United States, and witnesses whose depositions are taken and the persons taking
the same shall severally be entitled to the same fees as are paid for like services
in the courts of the United States.
(5) The several departments and agencies of the Government, when di-
rected by the President, shall furnish the Board, upon its request, all records,
papers, and information in their possession relating to any matter before the
Board.
SEC. 15. Any person who shall willfully assault, resist, prevent, or inter-
fere with any member of the Board or any of its agents or agencies in the per-
formance of duties pursuant to this Act shall be punished by a fine of not more
than $5,000 or by imprisonment for not more than one year, or both.
LIMITATIONS
SEC. 16. Nothing in this Act shall be construed so as to interfere with or
impede or diminish in any way the right to strike.
SEC. 17. Wherever the application, by means of code, agreement, board,
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law, or otherwise, of the provisions of section 7(a) of the National Industrial
Recovery Act (48 Stat. 198, U.S.C., title 15, sec. 706(a)), as amended from time
to time, conflicts with the application of the provisions of this Act, this Act shall
prevail: Provided, That in any situation where the provisions of this Act cannot
be validly enforced, the provisions of such other Acts shall apply.
SEC. 18. If any provision of this Act, or the application of such provision
to any person or circumstance, shall be held invalid, the remainder of this Act,
or the application of such provision to persons or circumstances other than those
as to which it is held invalid, shall not be affected thereby.
SEC. 19. This Act may be cited as the "National Labor Relations Act."
NLRA Draft 2
February 15, 1935
New Preamble, Amendments in Committee
Annotated by L. Keyserling in Margin
SECTION 1. Equality of bargaining power between employers and em-
ployees is not attained when the organization of employers in the corporate and
other forms of ownership association is not balanced by the free exercise by
employees of the right to bargain collectively through representatives of their
own choosing. Experience has proved that in the absence of such equality the
resultant failure to maintain equilibrium between the rate of wages and the rate
of industrial expansion impairs economic stability and aggravates recurrent de-
pressions, with consequent detriment to the general welfare and to the free flow
of commerce.
The lack of effective governmental machinery for promptly determining
who are the representatives of employees, and denials of the right to bargain
collectively through such representatives, establish unfair competitive advan-
tages in commerce as between employers, and lead to strikes and other manifes-
tations of economic strife as between employers and workers, thus creating
material obstacles to the free flow of commerce. Such equality cannot be estab-
lished and such unfair competitive advantages cannot be eliminated by state reg-
ulations and control because of the widespread distribution throughout the
states of establishments, plants or operations whose products compete in com-
merce, or the wide-spread distribution throughout the states of such products,
and the transfer of such plants, establishments, or operations from state to state,
thus making necessary the exercise of the federal power in order to foster, pro-
tect, and promote the free flow of commerce to increase the amount thereof, and
to remove obstacles and obstruction thereto.
It is hereby declared to be the policy of this Act to encourage the practice of
negotiating terms and conditions of employment through collective bargaining,
and to protect the exercise by the worker of full freedom of association, self-
organization, and designation of representatives of his own choosing, for the
purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection.
Section 2(5). [Sec. Perkins] . . . to bargaining subjects: wages, rates of
pay, hours of employment adds "or conditions of work."
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Section 3(b). [AFL Counsel Ogburn adds] "The Board shall report annu-
ally to the President."
Section 4(a). [Sec. Perkins adds] "Attorneys appointed under this section
may, at the direction of the Board, appear for and represent the Board in any
case in court. Nothing in this Act shall be construed to authorize the Board to
appoint individuals for the purpose of conciliations or mediation (or for statisti-
cal work), where such service may be obtained from the Department of Labor."
Section 6(b). [Sec. Perkins removed] "The Board shall have authority and
is directed to study the activities of such boards and agencies as have been or
may be hereafter established by agreement, code, or law to deal with labor dis-
putes, and to receive from such boards reports of their activities."
Section 8(2). [NLRB Compliance Chief Davis rewords] "To interfere in
any way with the formation or administration of any labor organization or con-
tribute financial or other support to it: Provided, That an employer may permit
employees without discrimination and subject to rules and regulations made and
published by the Board pursuant to section 6(a), to confer with him during
working hours without loss of time or pay, when engaged in the business of a
labor organization.
Section 8(5). [NLRB Chairman Biddle added]
(5) To refuse to bargain collectively with the representatives of his em-
ployees, subject to the provisions of Section 9(a).
or, (5) To refuse to bargain collectively with employees through their rep-
resentatives, chosen as provided in Section 9(a).
Section 9(c). [AFL Counsel Ogburn and Senator Borah reworded]
"Whenever a question affecting commerce arises as to who are the representa-
tives of employees in subsection (a), it shall be the duty of the Board to investi-
gate such question and to certify to the parties in writing the name or names of
such representatives. In any such investigation, the Board, its member, agent, or
agency, shall provide for an appropriate hearing, either in conjunction with a
proceeding under Section 10 or otherwise, and shall take a secret ballot of the
employees involved. The Board, its member, agent, or agency shall establish the
rules to govern any such election, and shall designate who may participate
therein'.
Section 10(a) [NLRB Compliance Chief Davis reworded] "The Board
shall have power, as hereinafter provided, to issue orders and take appropriate
steps to enforce or defend such orders, to prevent any person from engaging in
any unfair labor practice (listed in section 8) affecting commerce. This power
shall be vested exclusively in the Board, and shall not be affected by any other
means of adjustment or prevention that is or may be established by agreement,
code, law, or otherwise [except as provided in section 11.]
Section 10(b). [Senator Borah deleted]
Title II, Section 11. [Secretary Perkins deleted]
Title II, Section 12. [NLRB Compliance Chief Davis arbitration deleted]
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